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HOW TO PREVENT HARD CASES FROM MAKING BAD 
LAW: BEAR STEARNS, DELAWARE, AND THE STRATEGIC 




The Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan Chase merger placed Delaware 
between a rock and a hard place.  On the one hand, the deal’s 
unprecedented deal protection measures—especially the 39.5% share 
exchange agreement—were probably invalid under current 
Delaware doctrine because the measures rendered the Bear Stearns 
shareholders’ approval rights entirely illusory.  On the other hand, 
were a Delaware court to enjoin a deal brokered by the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury Department, and arguably necessary to 
prevent a collapse of the international financial system, it would 
invite just the sort of federal intervention that would undermine 
Delaware’s role as the de facto provider of U.S. corporate law. 
Faced with a choice between undermining the delicate and subtle 
balance struck between managers and shareholders and standing in 
the way of the imperatives of national and international economic 
policy, Delaware found a third way that avoided both horns of the 
dilemma: it took advantage of a pending New York action to stay the 
Delaware action and avoid making a decision.  In this Essay, we tell 
this story, analyzing the doctrinal issues under Delaware corporate 
and procedural law, and discussing the implications of this episode 
for our understanding of the landscape of U.S. corporate lawmaking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over half of the publicly traded corporations in the United States are 
incorporated in Delaware.  No other state even comes close.1  Under the 
“internal affairs” rule, the law of the state of incorporation governs the internal 
affairs of the corporation—the rules of corporate decision making; the 
allocation of power between shareholders, directors, and management; and 
fiduciary duties2—and other states often look to Delaware law in fashioning 
their own rules.3  Delaware, one of the smallest states in the nation, has thus 
become the de facto national lawmaker for corporate law.4 
Yet, Delaware’s dominant position in corporate law could be eroded.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission encroaches from a variety of directions.5  
Congress could enact a national corporate law.  Other states could displace 
Delaware, just as Delaware displaced New Jersey nearly 100 years ago.6 
Delaware has so far been successful in fending off these potential threats.  
To be sure, our colleague Mark Roe has expounded the view that Delaware 
enjoys little autonomy in devising its corporate law because it must constantly 
respond to the threat of federal preemption.7  We have argued that the 
relationship is far more complementary than Roe suggests.8  But, regardless of 
whether Roe or we are right about the extent of Delaware’s legal autonomy, it 
is clear that, from a business perspective, Delaware is a stunning success: 
 
 1 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 
383, 386 (2003); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1560 
(2002); Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover 
Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 349 (2006); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover 
Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1795, 1804 (2002). 
 2 18 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 43.72 
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2007). 
 3 Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts of other states 
commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in fashioning rules of corporate law.”). 
 4 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. 
L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005). 
 5 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003). 
 6 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
679, 727 (2002). 
 7 Roe, supra note 5, at 640. 
 8 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1578; see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations 
of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1771 (2006) (stating that “a symbiotic relationship 
between Delaware and the federal regulators” exists). 
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Delaware earns more than $550 million per year in franchise taxes;9  these fees 
amount to more than 20% of its annual tax revenues;10 Delaware’s market 
share of public corporations has increased from 30% for firms that went public 
between 1960 and 1964, to 56% for firms that went public between 1980 and 
1984, to 77% for firms that went public between 1995 and 1998;11 and no other 
state attracts more than a nominal percentage of public corporations that are 
not headquartered in the state.12  Until now, at least, any federal encroachment 
on Delaware’s autonomy may have hurt its pride, but not its pocketbook. 
Yet it remains true that there is no assurance that the goose that lays 
Delaware’s golden eggs will live forever.  As we have argued elsewhere, the 
biggest threat facing Delaware is the emergence of some major crisis that 
focuses public attention on the peculiar mode of U.S. corporate  
lawmaking—in which the elected officials and judges of one of the smallest 
states set the rules governing most publicly traded corporations—and 
undermines the public faith in Delaware’s ability to handle the job.13 
The recent events leading to the demise of Bear Stearns thus presented a 
problem for Delaware.  The shareholder litigation challenging J.P. Morgan 
Chase’s (J.P. Morgan) acquisition of Bear Stearns caught Delaware between a 
rock and a hard place.  How does Delaware respond when it finds itself with a 
choice between picking a fight it cannot win and maintaining the integrity of 
the fabric of Delaware corporate law? 
Delaware came up with a wonderful answer: let New York decide!  As we 
describe in this Essay, when faced with a set of deal protection measures that 
raised serious problems under Delaware law, Delaware managed what one 
might have thought impossible—it avoided a fight and also avoided 
undermining its nuanced jurisprudence—by the simple expedient of deferring 
to a court of a sister state (never mind that it was not the state of 
incorporation!). 
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the final days of Bear Stearns and the 
two deals it struck with J.P. Morgan.  Part II provides a legal analysis of the 
 
 9 BUDGET DEV., PLANNING & ADMIN., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FINANCIAL SUMMARY: BUDGET 
DOLLAR GOVERNOR’S RECOMMENDED BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2006), available at http://budget. 
delaware.gov/fy2008/operating/08opfinsumcharts.pdf (forecasting revenues for 2008). 
 10 See id. 
 11 Daines, supra note 1, at 1572. 
 12 Id. at 1600. 
 13 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1588–89. 
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deal protection measures in the Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan merger agreement, 
with particular attention to the Share Exchange Agreement (SEA), and 
explains why the SEA was probably invalid under current Delaware doctrine.  
Part III discusses the dilemma Delaware faced when asked to adjudicate a 
transaction that, on the one hand, was arguably needed to prevent the collapse 
of the financial system but that, on the other hand, was hard to reconcile with 
existing Delaware law.  Delaware escaped this dilemma by staying the 
Delaware action in favor of a contemporaneous action filed in New York state 
court.  Delaware’s decision to stay the action did not accord with its usual 
practice in resolving stay motions in significant corporate law cases and is best 
understood as a strategic decision to abstain from adjudicating a case that 
potentially threatened Delaware’s place in the corporate lawmaking landscape.  
Part IV examines the implications for corporate federalism. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The spectacular failure of Bear Stearns was front-page news.  Now that the 
dust has settled, the outlines of what happened are reasonably clear, although 
there is much that remains mysterious.  What follows is a sketch of the chain 
of events that led to J.P. Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns.14 
During the week of March 10, 2008, rumors began to circulate on Wall 
Street that Bear Stearns was in trouble, and customers began leaving in 
droves.15  By the end of the day on Thursday, March 13, it was clear that Bear 
Stearns faced a crisis.16  So many customers had removed their assets that Bear 
Stearns had exhausted $15 billion in cash reserves.17  Lenders who financed 
Bear Stearns’s operations refused to replenish the financing.18  Clients of other 
banks were pushing to get out of trades with Bear Stearns.19  By the evening of 
March 13, Bear Stearns was considering all options: it turned to J.P. Morgan to 
 
 14 See generally Bryan Burrough, The Collapse: Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, 
at 106; Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days: Paulson Pushed Low-Ball 
Bid, Relented; a Testy Time for Dimon, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Kelly, Neared 
Collapse]; Kate Kelly, Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns: Executives Bickered over 
Raising Cash, Cutting Mortgages, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Kelly, Lost Opportunities]; 
Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at A1 
[hereinafter Kelly, Fear]. 
 15 Burrough, supra note 14, at 108; Kelly, Fear, supra note 14. 
 16 Kelly, Fear, supra note 14. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
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see if J.P. Morgan would buy it; it considered filing for bankruptcy; and it 
spoke constantly with representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York camped out in its offices.20 
By early morning on Friday, March 14, time had run out.  The Federal 
Reserve and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) were concerned that a 
Bear Stearns collapse would have far-reaching effects.21  A Federal Reserve 
official was quoted as saying: “For the first time in history the entire world was 
looking at the failure of a major financial institution that could lead to a run on 
the entire world financial system . . . .  It was clear we couldn’t let that 
happen.”22  To prevent this from happening, J.P. Morgan, with nonrecourse 
financing from the Federal Reserve, agreed to provide financing to Bear 
Stearns for “up to 28 days.”23 
With the J.P. Morgan and Federal Reserve commitments, Bear Stearns was 
able to open for business on Friday, but customers continued to flee and 
trading partners continued to disappear.24  Throughout the day, Bear Stearns’s 
stock price continued to drop, closing at $32 per share.25  Teams from J.P. 
Morgan, private equity firms J.C. Flowers (Flowers) and Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co., and major banks poured over Bear Stearns’s financials.26  
Friday evening, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York President Timothy Geithner made it clear that a deal to sell Bear 
Stearns had to be announced by early Sunday evening when the Asian markets 
opened.27  The twenty-eight-day window had suddenly closed. 
By the end of the day on Saturday, March 15, Flowers made an offer 
contingent on lining up financing to continue Bear Stearns’s operations.28  
Later, J.P. Morgan indicated that it might be willing to buy Bear Stearns for $8 
to $12 per share.29 
 
 20 Burrough, supra note 14, at 152–53; Kelly, Fear, supra note 14. 
 21 Burrough, supra note 14, at 153. 
 22 Id. at 154. 
 23 Kelly, Fear, supra note 14. 
 24 Burrough, supra note 14, at 154. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Kelly, Neared Collapse, supra note 14. 
 27 Burrough, supra note 14, at 154; Kelly, Neared Collapse, supra note 14. 
 28 Kelly, Neared Collapse, supra note 14. 
 29 Id. 
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On Sunday morning, J.P. Morgan presented a draft merger agreement with 
the price left blank.30  It became clear that Flowers would not be able to go 
forward.  At about 10 a.m., J.P. Morgan withdrew its offer, but soon returned 
with a $4 per share offer, with the Federal Reserve taking responsibility for 
$30 billion of illiquid securities.31  Bear Stearns’s managers, irate with the low 
$4 per share price, seriously contemplated filing for bankruptcy.32  Paulson 
spoke with J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon and pushed for a price even lower 
than $4 per share.33  Paulson wanted to avoid the impression that the 
government was bailing out the shareholders of an investment bank that had 
engaged in speculation, while offering no help to the little guy who had 
defaulted on his sub-prime mortgage.34 
By mid-afternoon on Sunday, March 16, J.P. Morgan made a firm offer of 
$2 per share.35  Faced with a choice of filing for bankruptcy or accepting $2 
per share, the Bear Stearns board accepted.36 
The March 16 merger agreement contained a variety of fairly standard 
“deal protection” measures.  J.P. Morgan received an option to buy Bear 
Stearns’s corporate headquarters building for $1.1 billion (Asset Option), and 
an option to buy just under 20% of Bear Stearns stock at $2 per share.37  The 
Bear Stearns board also provided the necessary approvals to waive the 
limitations on business combinations under § 203 of Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL).38  But, as is the case with most mergers, under 
§ 251 of the DGCL, the Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan merger required approval 
by a majority of Bear Stearns’s outstanding shares.39 
During the week of March 17, it became clear that Bear Stearns 
shareholder approval could not be assumed.  A variety of shareholders, 
 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Heidi N. Moore, Bear Stearns: How to Buy a Distressed Investment Bank, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, 
at A1. 
 38 AGREEMENT & PLAN OF MERGER BY & BETWEEN THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC. & JPMORGAN 
CHASE & CO., § 3.10, at 14 (Mar. 16, 2008), available at http://www.bearstearns.com/includes/pdfs/ 
investor_relations/merger.pdf; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2007) (detailing three-year limitation on 
business combinations between corporations and interested stockholders unless certain conditions are met). 
 39 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c). 
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including some of the largest ones, had seen the value of their Bear Stearns 
shares fall from a high of $131.58 in October 2007 to $70 per share in early 
March 2008, and now voiced opposition to the proposed merger at $2 per 
share.40  Many took the position that if that was all they would get, they might 
as well take their chances.41  Approval of the merger on the original terms 
seemed far from certain.42  At the same time, customers continued to pull out 
assets, thus reducing the value of the company as a stand-alone entity or as an 
acquisition target. 
In response to shareholder opposition, Bear Stearns and J.P. Morgan 
revisited the original $2 deal.  J.P. Morgan demanded, as part of any 
renegotiated deal, that Bear Stearns allow it to hold 51% of Bear Stearns shares 
to assure shareholder approval.43  Bear Stearns argued that it would need to get 
a higher price per share.44  Over the weekend of March 22–23, intense 
negotiations continued.  Concerned again that a Bear Stearns bankruptcy could 
imperil the financial system, Paulson reluctantly acquiesced in a higher price.45  
In the early morning hours of March 24, a revised deal was announced.46  
Under the Amended Merger Agreement and the related SEA, the merger 
consideration was increased to about $10 per share, the J.P. Morgan and 
Federal Reserve guarantees were limited, the § 203 waiver and the Asset 
Option were retained, and, most importantly for our purposes, an additional 
deal protection measure was included: the share exchange.47  Under the SEA, 
J.P. Morgan would receive, through an exchange of J.P. Morgan shares, 
95 million newly issued shares of Bear Stearns common stock (amounting to 
39.5% of the then-outstanding shares), with the share exchange to be 
completed before the April 8, 2008 record date for the Bear Stearns 
shareholder vote on the Amended Merger Agreement.48  The admitted purpose 
 
 40 Kelly, Fear, supra note 14. 
 41 Kelly, Neared Collapse, supra note 14. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *8–*9 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 9, 2008). 
 48 J.P. Morgan Co., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Mar. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/drDX9.t9g.htm#1stPage. 
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of the SEA was to provide assurance to J.P. Morgan that the transaction would 
receive the requisite approval of Bear Stearns shareholders.49 
Neither the Amended Merger Agreement nor the SEA limited J.P. 
Morgan’s ability to acquire additional shares.  Without limits placed on market 
purchases, J.P. Morgan bought an additional 11.5 million shares at $12.23 per 
share on March 24, the date the SEA was announced,50 and another 10 million 
shares or so before April 18.51  According to J.P. Morgan’s own securities 
filings, these purchases were made to “increase the likelihood that the plan to 
rescue Bear Stearns [would] be completed.”52  By the time of the Bear Stearns 
shareholder vote, J.P. Morgan controlled around 49.73% of all outstanding 
shares.53  And it had acquired this stake without any approval of the other Bear 
Stearns shareholders. 
The frenzied negotiations were, of course, accompanied by the filing of 
lawsuits.  On March 17 and 18, the two days following the $2-per-share 
merger agreement announcement, stockholder class actions were filed in New 
York Supreme Court.54  On Thursday, March 20, and Monday, March 24 (the 
day the Amended Merger Agreement and SEA were announced), stockholder 
class actions were filed in Delaware Chancery Court.55  On March 27, the 
defendants moved to dismiss or stay the Delaware action in favor of the New 
York action.  On April 9, the Delaware Chancery Court granted the motion to 
 
 49 JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al., General Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Form 13D), at 6 (Apr. 3, 
2008) [hereinafter JPMorgan, April 3 13D], available at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.t28H1.htm#1stPage 
(“J.P. Morgan Chase acquired the shares of Common Stock in order to increase the likelihood that the plan to 
rescue Bear Stearns will be completed.”). 
 50 Id. at 16. 
 51 See JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al., Amendment to General Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Form 
13D/A), at 6 (Apr. 21, 2008) [hereinafter JPMorgan, April 21 13D], available at http://www.secinfo. 
com/drDX9.tEk.htm#1stPage (stating that J.P. Morgan purchased approximately 200,000 shares between April 
15, 2008, and April 18, 2008); JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al., Amendment to General Statement of Beneficial 
Ownership (Form 13D/A), at 6 (Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://www.secinfo.com/drDX9.tdr.htm#1stPage 
(stating that J.P. Morgan purchased approximately 3.3 million shares between April 11, 2008, and April 14, 
2008); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Amendment to General Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Form 13D/A), at 
6 (Apr. 11, 2008), available at http://www.secinfo.com/drDX9.tCy.htm#1stPage (stating that J.P. Morgan 
purchased approximately 2.4 million shares between April 8, 2008, and April 10, 2008); JPMorgan Chase & 
Co. et al., Amendment to General Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Form 13D/A), at 6 (Apr. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.t2bFc.htm#1stPage (stating that J.P. Morgan purchased 
approximately 3.2 million shares between March 25, 2008, and April 7, 2008). 
 52 JPMorgan, April 3 13D, supra note 49, at 6. 
 53 JPMorgan, April 21 13D, supra note 51, at 6. 
 54 In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *9 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 9, 2008). 
 55 Id. 
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stay.56  Thus, it looked like it would be the New York court, rather than the 
Delaware court, that would decide the issues raised by the case and, 
specifically, the important question of whether the Bear Stearns board acted 
appropriately in signing the SEA. 
The end of this story, alas, is anticlimactic.  With no other bid forthcoming 
and shareholder opposition waning, on May 7 the plaintiffs in the New York 
action withdrew their motion to enjoin the merger.57  On May 29, the merger 
was approved by 84% of the Bear Stearns shares.58  On December 4, the New 
York damages action was dismissed on summary judgment.59 
II. THE ISSUES UNDER DELAWARE LAW 
The SEA, under which J.P. Morgan acquired 39.5% of the Bear Stearns 
shares in advance of the shareholder vote, was an unprecedented deal 
protection measure and raised difficult and important issues under Delaware 
law.60  In this Part, we argue that, under existing statutory and case law, the 
SEA was invalid and should have been enjoined.  This, of course, does not 
mean that we believe that a Delaware court actually would have invalidated the 
SEA.  To the contrary, as we discuss below, we think that the SEA would have 
been upheld by any court asked to rule on it.  It was this combination—the 
practical necessity of upholding the SEA versus its dubious legality under 
current Delaware law—that put the SEA challenge into the “Hard Cases Make 
Bad Law” category and placed Delaware in a peculiar dilemma. 
Mergers under DGCL § 251 require both a recommendation of the board of 
directors and approval by a majority of the outstanding shares.61  This 
 
 56 Id. at *8. 
 57 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 116 (May 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvr4.t5Cs.htm#1stPage. 
 58 Kate Kelly, Mike Spector, & Randall Smith, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Bear’s Final Moment: An 
Apology and No Lack of Ire, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2008, at C1. 
 59 In re Bear Stearns Litig., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7075 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 4, 2008). 
 60 Although, under New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, shareholder approval is ordinarily required 
for issuance of more than 20% of outstanding shares, see NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 312.03 
(2007), an exception can be granted by the NYSE “when (1) the delay in securing stockholder approval would 
seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise and (2) reliance by the company on this exception 
is expressly approved by the Audit Committee of the Board,” see id. § 312.05.  In entering into the SEA, Bear 
Stearns relied on this exception and, on April 4, received approval from the NYSE.  Press Release, Bear 
Stearns Cos. Inc., Bear Stearns Receives NYSE Approval for Shares to Be Issued to J.P. Morgan Chase (Apr. 
4, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS208849+04-Apr-2008+BW20080404. 
 61 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2007). 
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two-stage process is a centerpiece of the Delaware corporate governance 
system, with both elements considered critical.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
has held that a board cannot submit a merger agreement to the shareholders 
without making a recommendation, and the board’s duty to take a position on a 
merger is one of the hooks on which the structure of fiduciary duties is hung.62  
Equally, the shareholders’ right under § 251(a) to vote down a merger 
approved by the board forms the foundation of courts’ scrutiny of defensive 
tactics, including deal protection measures.63  Although issues arise in a variety 
of contexts, the fundamental principle governing these issues is that 
shareholders’ votes must be uncoerced.64 
In a recent law review article, Delaware Court of Chancery Vice 
Chancellor Leo Strine argued that a focus on “uncoerced stockholder choice” 
provided the best guide to the case law that balances the competing interests.65  
Although, said Strine, this standard provides substantial discretion to directors, 
it also sets clear limits: 
At the same time, this emphasis on stockholder choice recognizes 
that a stock-for-stock merger agreement is not an ordinary contract 
within the sole power of the directors to consummate.  Stockholders 
have the right to vote yes or no without being, in essence, compelled 
or coerced.  Stockholders can legitimately expect that their directors 
will bring a merger proposal to a reasonably prompt vote so that the 
mere passage of time does not leave the board’s preferred deal as the 
only viable corporate strategy.  Stockholders also have a right to a 
genuine, current recommendation from their directors regarding the 
advisability of the transaction.66 
The fundamental problem with the Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan SEA is that it 
eliminated the effective “right to vote yes or no without being . . . compelled or 
coerced.”67  In doing so, it made a mockery of the approval requirement under 
§ 251. 
 
 62 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 879 (Del. 1985); see also A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Merger 
Agreements Under Delaware Law—When Can Directors Change Their Minds?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815, 
818–19 (1997). 
 63 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43 (Del. 1994). 
 64 See, e.g., id. 
 65 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger 
Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919, 941–42 (2001). 
 66 Id. at 942. 
 67 Id. 
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In this Part, we first discuss three separate doctrinal frameworks in 
Delaware law through which a Delaware court would likely have analyzed the 
Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan SEA: the Unocal/Unitrin framework, the Omnicare 
framework, and the Condec/Blasius framework.68  We then discuss some 
arguments, based on existing precedent, for upholding the agreement.  We 
conclude that, under existing doctrine, the case for upholding the SEA was 
weak.  This placed a Delaware court in a very difficult situation.  A Delaware 
judge could have done one of the following if forced to make a decision: 
invalidate the agreement, with the risks that entailed; fashion a new rule of 
Delaware law that Delaware would then have to spend years explaining and 
limiting; or pretend, under the world’s attention, that the facts of the case or the 
law of Delaware were different from what they were, and thus expose the court 
to ridicule.  None of these was an attractive option. 
A. The Unocal/Unitrin Analysis 
The Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.69  and Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
General Corp.70 cases provide the basic framework within which Delaware 
courts review defensive actions by a board of directors.  As the earlier 
description makes clear, the SEA was adopted to ensure that the preferred deal 
 
 68 The Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan SEA also raised issues under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).  Whether or not the Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan merger was 
approved, the SEA combined with J.P. Morgan’s freedom to acquire additional shares created a controlling 
shareholder where there had not been one before.  See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.  Therefore, 
under QVC the SEA could trigger Revlon (although, because J.P. Morgan itself is widely held, one could argue 
that it does not).  See QVC, 637 A.2d at 46 (stating that a stock-for-stock merger that results in a controlling 
shareholder in a company that previously had dispersed ownership constitutes a change of control that triggers 
Revlon duties).  However, it is not clear that an analysis under Revlon adds anything to the analyses under 
Unocal/Unitrin, Omnicare, and Condec/Blasius.  See infra Part III.A–C.  It could be important in two different 
ways.  First, when a board is in “Revlon mode,” only shareholder interests count.  QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (“In 
the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the transaction 
offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must exercise their fiduciary duties 
to further that end.  The decisions of this Court have consistently emphasized this goal.”).  Second, Revlon 
requires some sort of market test: either an auction before an agreement is reached or at least the possibility of 
a competing bid afterward.  Id. at 44–45.  Because of time pressures, only the briefest of auctions was 
conducted before the merger agreement was signed.  See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.  The 
SEA, combined with J.P. Morgan’s post-March 24 stock purchases, gave J.P. Morgan a 49.7% position and, in 
so doing, precluded any sort of post-agreement market test.  See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.  
Whether, in this circumstance, the board could, consistent with Revlon, agree to a deal that did not leave the 
shareholders with the opportunity to accept a competing bid is an issue fully discussed in the context of 
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).  See infra Part III.B. 
 69 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985). 
 70 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). 
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with J.P. Morgan was approved and that no competing bid emerged.71  It was, 
therefore, a classic defensive measure subject to the two-pronged 
Unocal/Unitrin test.  The first prong requires that the board reasonably 
perceives that there is a threat to the corporation.72  The second prong requires 
that any defense be reasonable in relation to the threat.73 
The second prong of the Unocal/Unitrin test is of particular interest here.  
Unitrin established a bifurcated analysis for deciding whether a defense is 
reasonable.74  First, the court must decide whether a defense is coercive or 
preclusive.75  If the court finds a defense to be coercive or preclusive, it will 
find that defense invalid.76  Second, if a defense is not, the court then turns to 
whether the defense falls within a “range of reasonableness,” a relatively 
permissive standard.77  Unitrin provided definitions of both key concepts: a 
response is “coercive” if it is aimed at forcing on stockholders a management-
sponsored alternative to a hostile offer;78 and a response is “preclusive” if it 
deprives stockholders of the right to receive all tender offers or precludes a 
bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting proxy contests or 
otherwise.79 
Applying Unitrin’s definitions directly, it is difficult to imagine an action 
by a board that could be more coercive and preclusive than the SEA.  With the 
SEA, J.P. Morgan instantly acquired a 39.5% voting block, almost 80% of the 
votes needed to approve the merger.  But the SEA did not stop there.  It did not 
contain any standstill agreement or other limitation on J.P. Morgan’s market 
purchases, any duty by J.P. Morgan to support a higher offer, or any right of 
the board not to submit the merger to a shareholder vote if it no longer 
recommended the merger.80  In fact, J.P. Morgan, unconstrained by any such 
restrictions, immediately began acquiring additional Bear Stearns shares so 
 
 71 See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
 72 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958. 
 73 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1387–88. 
 78 Id. at 1387 (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del. 1989)).  
 79 See id. (citing Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154–55) (stating that because Time’s board did not preclude 
Paramount from making an offer for the combined Time-Warner company, the board’s response was not 
preclusive). 
 80 Bear Stearns Cos., Inc., Current Report: Share Exchange Agreement (Form 8-K, Exh. 2.2), at § 2.2 
(Mar. 24, 2008) [hereinafter March 24 Exhibit], available at http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.t8b.c. 
htm#1stPage. 
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that it had just shy of 50% of the outstanding shares in advance of the meeting 
to vote on the merger.81  Of course, J.P. Morgan could have easily acquired a 
little more, giving it the power to approve the merger without the vote of a 
single other shareholder,82 but what would have been the point of doing so? 
Under these circumstances, two things were clear: existing shareholders 
could not vote the deal down and remain independent, and no other bidder 
would have had any chance of succeeding with a higher offer.  Thus, the SEA 
was coercive under the Unitrin definition because it literally forced the Bear 
Stearns–J.P. Morgan merger on shareholders.  Even if an overwhelming 
majority of the non-J.P. Morgan shareholders would have opposed the merger, 
the merger would still have received the requisite shareholder votes.  The SEA 
was preclusive because it deprived shareholders of the ability to receive any 
other offers and precluded any other bidder from seeking control, by giving the 
board’s preferred merger partner a controlling interest, the most fundamental 
restriction possible of a proxy contest. 
Notably, the Bear Stearns board entered into the SEA without any 
shareholder approval and, as far as we know, without even consulting any of 
the larger Bear Stearns shareholders not represented on the Bear Stearns board.  
Indeed, the SEA and the Amended Merger Agreement were motivated by 
shareholder opposition to the initial deal struck by the board.83  With 
shareholders up in arms and threatening to oppose the initial merger, the board, 
on its own, gave up the effective right of shareholders to vote down the J.P. 
Morgan deal in exchange for an increase in the merger consideration.  To be 
sure, the increase (relative to the original $2 deal) was substantial.  But the 
obvious point of the dual approval requirement embodied in § 251 is not that 
the board can dispense with a shareholder vote if a deal is good enough, but 
that it is the prerogative of the shareholders to decide, in an uncoerced fashion, 
whether a deal is good enough.84  Undermining this principle would have 
important ramifications for Delaware law. 
Indeed, there is a large Delaware jurisprudence on the permissible scope of 
deal protection measures under Unocal/Unitrin.  The issue typically arises in 
contexts very similar to the Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan situation: a target board 
and an acquirer, which have negotiated a merger agreement, are concerned that 
 
 81 JPMorgan, April 3 13D, supra note 49. 
 82 March 24 Exhibit, supra note 80, at § 2.2. 
 83 Kelly, Neared Collapse, supra note 14. 
 84 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43 (Del. 1994). 
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shareholders will not approve it.  To address this possibility, the merger 
agreement sometimes includes a variety of measures, such as an agreement to 
sell a valuable asset for a low price (asset lockup), an agreement to sell a block 
of shares for either a low price or the deal price (stock lockup), or an 
agreement to pay the merger party a sum of money (termination fee), each 
contingent on the deal not being approved.85 
The traditional deal protection measures discussed in Delaware cases are 
significantly less coercive and preclusive than the provisions at issue in the 
Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan merger.  Typical provisions such as asset and stock 
lockups and termination fees are primarily designed to confer an economic 
benefit on the favored bidder if another bidder should acquire the target at a 
higher price (or, to a lesser extent, if shareholders independently fail to 
approve the deal).86  Their direct effect is thus to offer a consolation prize to 
the favored bidder should the deal fall through, as compensation and 
inducement for the effort to make a bid to start with.  Despite their names, 
lockup provisions do not confer nearly enough (and often no) voting power on 
the favored bidder to lock up a deal in the literal sense.87  Any lockup effect of 
these traditional measures is generated by the size of the economic benefit 
conferred on the friendly acquirer.88  Because this benefit comes out of the 
pocket of target shareholders (and, if there is hostile interference, of the hostile 
bidder),89 any alternative to the negotiated merger must be sufficiently valuable 
to the target shareholders to make it economically desirable for them to reject 
the merger.  This, of course, depends on the value of the negotiated merger to 
target shareholders, the size of the economic benefit conferred by the deal 
protection devices, and the value of any alternative—factors that will differ 
from case to case.90  Some commentators believe that these traditional devices 
rarely affect the outcome of a bidding contest.91  Still, at least in theory, these 
 
 85 These deal protection devices, if large enough, also have the effect of discouraging competing bids.  
We do not address this aspect directly as there was no competing offer for Bear Stearns and no evidence that a 
competing offer was scared away by the deal protection measures. 
 86 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1539, 1545 (1996). 
 87 Id. at 1543. 
 88 Id. at 1545. 
 89 Id. at 1542, 1545. 
 90 See Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover 
Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 704 (1990); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 86. 
 91 See Ayres, supra note 90, at 703–04 (arguing that only “foreclosing” lockups affect the outcome of a 
contest); Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739 (1994). 
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traditional sorts of deal protection measures can rise to a magnitude at which 
they economically coerce shareholders into approving a merger. 
Vice Chancellor Strine provided the following intentionally extreme 
example of an unacceptable measure: 
In our hypothetical merger agreement, for example, provided that 
Angstrom would receive a 50% termination fee if the Zuckerman 
stockholders voted no, very few of us would think that was 
permissible.  By making the costs of voting no[t] so extreme, the 
Zuckerman board has in effect usurped all of the power to approve 
the merger to itself, in derogation of the statutory allocation of 
powers.  Put simply, the Zuckerman board cannot contract away its 
stockholders’ right to make an uncoerced decision.92 
Delaware courts have enjoined traditional deal protection measures which 
interfere with shareholders’ decisions.  Thus, for example, in Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,93 the Delaware Supreme Court 
addressed the combination of a $100 million termination fee and an uncapped 
option to purchase 19.9% of the stock at the deal price with unusually 
favorable payment terms (payable with a note, with a right to settle in cash).94  
Both the termination fee and the stock option would have been triggered by a 
negative shareholder vote.95  The court held that the stock option contained 
several “draconian” features and was clearly invalid.96  In other cases, 
Delaware courts have approved termination fees in the range of 2% to 4% of a 
deal’s value,97 have expressed skepticism about a fee over 6%,98 and have 
made it clear that there are no hard and fast rules.99 
The SEA is substantially more draconian than these deal protection 
devices.  From a purely economic perspective, should there be a bidding war 
 
 92 Strine, supra note 65, at 933 n.39. 
 93 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 94 Id. at 39. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 50. 
 97 See In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) (3%); McMillan v. Intercargo 
Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505–06 (Del. Ch. 2000) (3.5%); Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1996) 
(2%); Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Margaux, Inc., 674 A.2d 889, 897 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (2.8%); Roberts v. Gen. 
Instrument Corp., No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990) (2%); Lewis v. Leaseway 
Transp. Corp., No. 8720, 1990 WL 67383, at *3, *8 (Del. Ch. May 6, 1990) (3%); Braunschweiger v. Am. 
Home Shield Corp., No. 10755, 1989 WL 128571, at *4, *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989) (2.3%). 
 98 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. 17398, 17383, & 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, 
at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999). 
 99 L.A. Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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for Bear Stearns, the 39.5% SEA would offer an even greater opportunity for 
profits than the uncapped 19.9% stock option that was held invalid in QVC.100  
More importantly, however, the SEA, whether considered by itself or in the 
context of J.P. Morgan’s permitted additional stock purchases, conferred on 
J.P. Morgan sufficient voting power to make it virtually impossible for existing 
Bear Stearns shareholders to vote down the Amended Merger Agreement. 
From this perspective, the facts of Unitrin are illustrative.  In Unitrin, the 
board of Unitrin was faced with a hostile offer and engaged in a share 
repurchase that increased the stake held by board members (who had agreed 
not to sell their shares) from 23% to 28%.101  The Chancery Court invalidated 
the share repurchase program under Unocal.102  The Delaware Supreme Court 
reversed, finding that the program was neither coercive nor preclusive.103  But 
in doing so, it engaged in a probing analysis of Unitrin’s shareholder base.  
First, it found that there was no reason to believe that all board  
members—which included some large, outside shareholders—would 
automatically oppose any bid.104  Moreover, even if all board members 
opposed the bid, the court found that the increase in the board’s stake from 
23% to 28%, given the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, 
would not present a barrier that a hostile bidder could not realistically 
overcome.105 
The contrast between the facts in Unitrin and those in the Bear Stearns 
situation are stark.  Unlike the outside board members in Unitrin, J.P. Morgan 
could surely be expected to oppose any competing bid and to vote in favor of 
the merger even if, at the time of the vote, the merger looked like a bad deal for 
Bear Stearns.  The SEA represented an increase in J.P. Morgan’s ownership 
 
 100 The distinction between the actual acquisition of stock envisioned by the SEA and the mere option in 
QVC is not economically meaningful in the context of these transactions.  To be sure, the fact that Viacom 
only received an option means that it would have had no incentive to exercise the option if the value of 
Paramount dropped below the deal price.  QVC, 637 A.2d at 39.  But Viacom also had a contractual obligation 
to consummate the merger at the deal price.  Id.  If the value of Paramount dropped, it was Viacom’s 
contractual obligation under the merger agreement that is important and not Viacom’s rights under the deal 
protection measures.  But if Viacom had consummated the merger, it would not have mattered whether it first 
exercised the option.  Because Viacom had an obligation to consummate the merger under the merger 
agreement, the fact that Viacom received an option rather than shares conferred no downside risk protection on 
Viacom. 
 101 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1377–78 (Del. 1995). 
 102 Id. at 1375–77. 
 103 Id. at 1388. 
 104 Id. at 1380–81. 
 105 Id. at 1383. 
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that, on its own, was eight times higher than the increase at issue in  
Unitrin—from 0% to 39.5%106 versus 23% to 28%.107  Adding the 11.5 million 
shares that J.P. Morgan acquired contemporaneously with the announcement of 
the SEA brought J.P. Morgan’s stake to 45%; including the shares acquired in 
the ensuing weeks, J.P. Morgan’s ownership increased to 49.73%.108  Any 
notion that the deal was not locked up by March 24—because J.P. Morgan’s 
ownership was below 50% and there was a hypothetical possibility that the 
shareholders would not approve the deal109—flies in the face of both reality as 
well as the careful, contextual analysis performed by the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Unitrin. 
For these reasons, we believe that the SEA was coercive and preclusive and 
therefore invalid under Unocal/Unitrin.  But even if the SEA could somehow 
survive Unocal/Unitrin scrutiny, it would face further hurdles. 
B. The Omnicare Analysis 
The 2003 Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Omnicare v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc. arose in the specific context of voting agreements and has 
particular application to the SEA.110  At issue in Omnicare were agreements by 
the controlling shareholders to vote in favor of a proposed merger and an 
agreement by the board to submit the merger to a shareholder vote even if it no 
longer believed, at the time of the vote, that the merger was in the company’s 
best interest.111  The Delaware Supreme Court held that these agreements were 
coercive and preclusive because they rendered the merger a fait accompli: 
The record reflects that the defensive devices employed by the NCS 
board are preclusive and coercive in the sense that they accomplished 
a fait accompli.  In this case, despite the fact that the NCS board has 
withdrawn its recommendation for the Genesis transaction and 
recommended its rejection by the stockholders, the deal protection 
devices approved by the NCS board operated in concert to have a 
preclusive and coercive effect.112 
 
 106 JPMorgan, April 3 13D, supra note 49, at 8. 
 107 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1377–78. 
 108 JPMorgan, April 3 13D, supra note 49, at 8. 
 109 See supra text accompanying notes 83–84. 
 110 818 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 2003). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 936. 
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Omnicare is a problematic and widely criticized opinion.113  The voting 
agreements in that case were executed by the company’s shareholders, not by 
the board of directors.114  The agreements thus did not raise the concern 
underlying Unocal that the board was acting in its own interest in adopting a 
defensive device or the concern that the board was usurping shareholders’ 
effective right to vote on a merger.115  To be sure, the board in Omnicare made 
a firm agreement to submit the merger to a shareholder vote.116  Such 
agreements, however, are specifically permitted by the DGCL,117 and the court 
did not find any flaws in the process that the board engaged in before it signed 
the agreement.118  Rather, the holding in Omnicare was based on the principle 
that there must always be an effective “out,” and if the shareholder vote is not 
an effective out (because of voting agreements signed by the shareholders) 
then the board cannot give up the right to withdraw its recommendation and 
pull the proposed deal from a shareholder vote.119 
Under the reasoning of Omnicare, the SEA would face an uphill battle.  As 
in Omnicare, the Bear Stearns board agreed to submit the merger to a 
shareholder vote even if it no longer believed, at the time of the vote, that the 
merger was in the company’s best interest.  The SEA, in effect, accomplished a 
fait accompli.  Even standing by itself, the 39.5% stake transferred in the SEA 
would make it exceedingly difficult to defeat the deal on the shareholder level.  
But coupled with J.P. Morgan’s contemporaneous acquisition of another 5% of 
Bear Stearns’s stock, and its further acquisition of another 5% over the 
following weeks, this extreme difficulty became an impossibility.  Given the 
timing of these acquisitions and the lack of any contractual restrictions on J.P. 
 
 113 E.g., Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of Corporate Law, 71 
TENN. L. REV. 511, 512–13 (2004); Robert A. Profusek & Lyle G. Ganske, Lockups and Beyond in “Omnicare 
v. NCS Healthcare,” N.Y.L.J., May 30, 2003, at 4.  Although Omnicare has been criticized, and many 
Delaware practitioners expect that it will be overruled or limited when the issue is next taken up by the 
Delaware Supreme Court, there are no post-Omnicare Delaware Supreme Court opinions that cast any doubt 
on it. 
 114 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 926. 
 115 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–57 (Del. 1985).  Although the noncontrolling 
shareholders in Omnicare lacked an effective right to defeat the merger, that was true regardless of the voting 
agreement.  The effect of the voting agreement was to eliminate the ability of the controlling shareholders to 
defeat the merger.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 919.  As the controlling shareholders had agreed to the voting 
agreement, it is hard to see what was problematic about this. 
 116 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 918.  The board of Bear Stearns made a similar commitment.  March 24 
Exhibit, supra note 80, at § 2.6. 
 117 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(6) (2007). 
 118 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 918. 
 119 Id. at 936–37. 
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Morgan’s right to purchase additional shares, it is evident that J.P. Morgan 
intended to buy additional shares and that Bear Stearns should have expected 
J.P. Morgan to buy additional shares when it agreed to the SEA.  A court 
would thus be hard-pressed to ignore these purchases in analyzing the SEA. 
Moreover, the SEA is substantially more problematic than the agreements 
at issue in Omnicare.  In Omnicare, the existing controlling shareholders, 
acting in good faith and ensuring that noncontrolling shareholders would 
receive equal consideration, committed to vote in favor of the merger.120  By 
contrast, the SEA was an issuance of new shares by board action, which when 
combined with J.P. Morgan’s market purchases created a new controlling 
shareholder and was designed to take the decision entirely out of the hands of 
shareholders.121 
C. Interfering with the Shareholders’ Vote 
Two overlapping lines of Delaware cases address attempts by a board to 
interfere with the exercise of the shareholder franchise.  The older line of 
cases—Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.122 and cases following it—
addresses targeted stock issuances and has consistently enjoined stock 
issuances made to entrench management, to dilute controlling shareholders, or 
to change the outcome of a shareholder vote.  The second, somewhat newer, 
line of cases derives from Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.123  As we 
discuss in this section, the SEA was probably invalid under the Condec line of 
cases, while the analysis under Blasius is not fully resolved.  On the one hand, 
this means that the Delaware courts would not have had to engage in doctrinal 
contortions to reject a Blasius claim.  On the other hand, it means that the 
question of the SEA’s validity under Blasius raised important and novel issues 
under Delaware law. 
In Condec, Lunkenheimer’s board had agreed to sell all its assets to U.S. 
Industries, subject to approval by two-thirds of the outstanding shares.124  
Condec, which sought to merge with Lunkenheimer, bought shares in the 
market and, pursuant to a tender offer, accumulated enough shares to block 
approval.125  In response, Lunkenheimer agreed to issue enough shares to U.S. 
 
 120 Id. at 925–26. 
 121 See supra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 122 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967). 
 123 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 124 Condec, 230 A.2d at 774. 
 125 Id. at 774–75. 
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Industries (in exchange for shares of U.S. Industries) to assure the requisite 
stockholder approval.126  The court concluded that the primary purchase of the 
share issuance was “to prevent control of Lunkenheimer from passing to 
Condec and to cause such control to pass into the hands of U.S. Industries.”127  
In light of this finding, the court enjoined the stock issuance, holding that 
[T]he transaction here attacked . . . was clearly unwarranted because 
it unjustifiably strikes at the very heart of corporate representation by 
causing a stockholder with an equitable right to a majority of 
corporate stock to have his right to a proportionate voice and 
influence in corporate affairs to be diminished by the simple act of an 
exchange of stock which brought no money into the Lunkenheimer 
treasury, was not connected with a stock option plan or other proper 
corporate purpose, and which was obviously designed for the 
primary purpose of reducing Condec’s stock holdings in 
Lunkenheimer below a majority.128 
A variety of other cases, including Canadian Southern Oils v. Manabi 
Exploration Co.129 and Packer v. Yampol130 take a similar approach.131 
Condec is very similar to this case.  In both cases, the purpose of the share 
exchange was to affect the outcome of a shareholder vote.  In both cases, no 
new capital was brought into the firm.  In both cases, it was not part of a long-
term plan to acquire new operations or to pursue any other long-term corporate 
interest.  On the other hand, unlike in Condec, J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns 
faced only the possibility of opposition by dispersed shareholders, rather than 
the definite opposition of a single majority shareholder.  This being said, it is 
likely that here, as in Condec, the primary purpose of the share issuance was to 
 
 126 Id. at 775. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 777. 
 129 96 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 1953) (enjoining issuance of shares where the primary purpose was to deprive 
majority shareholder of voting control). 
 130 No. 8432, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) (enjoining the issuance of two newly 
created series of preferred stock with super voting features that had conferred approximately 33% of the 
outstanding voting rights). 
 131 See also WNH Investments v. Batzel, No. 13931, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 1995) 
(enjoining dilutive stock issuance for the purpose of defeating a challenge to the board’s control); Phillips v. 
Insituform, No. 9173, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 474 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987) (“[I] conclude that no justification 
has been shown that would arguably make the extraordinary step of issuance of stock for the admitted purpose 
of impeding the exercise of stockholder rights reasonable in light of the corporate benefit, if any, sought to be 
obtained.”); cf. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) (enjoining the issuance of shares to 
an employee stock ownership plan to dilute the holdings of a control shareholder just after control had been 
acquired as invalid entrenchment). 
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reduce the stock holdings of the potential opponents to the merger to less than 
a majority.  There is no obvious reason why Delaware law should be less 
protective of the ability of dispersed shareholders to vote down a transaction 
than it is of the ability of a single shareholder to do so. 
To be sure, because Delaware corporate law does not provide for 
mandatory preemptive rights, Delaware courts will not enjoin an issuance of 
stock merely because it will dilute the interests of existing stockholders.  In 
Glazer v. Zapata Corp.,132 for example, Chancellor Allen refused to enjoin the 
issuance of shares as part of a financing transaction even though that issuance 
diluted the insurgent shareholder’s interest.  The difference between cases like 
Glazer, on the one side, and Condec, Canadian Southern Oils, and Packer, on 
the other, is the purpose of the issuance and, aligning this line of cases with 
Unocal/Unitrin, whether there is a threat to the corporation.133  As the 
Chancery Court held in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, “the prospects of losing a 
validly conducted shareholder vote cannot . . . constitute a legitimate threat to a 
corporate interest.”134  When stock is issued for the primary purpose of 
affecting the outcome of a shareholder vote, Delaware cases indicate that it 
will ordinarily be found to be an abuse of power.135 
Nonetheless, and in keeping with Delaware’s fact-specific and case-by-case 
style of adjudication, there is no per se prohibition against dilutive stock 
issuances, even when their primary purpose is to affect the outcome of a 
shareholder vote.  Although the Delaware courts have not, as far as we can tell, 
ever approved a dilutive stock issuance close to the magnitude of the SEA, the 
cases have been careful to leave open the possibility that intentionally diluting 
even a controlling shareholder may be justified if the issuance is, in language 
echoing Blasius, “to further a compelling corporate purpose.”136  Thus, in 
 
 132 658 A.2d 176 (Del. Ch. 1993). 
 133 Id. at 186 (“These cases stand for the proposition that directors may not act to frustrate the efforts of 
stockholders to elect new directors by engaging in transactions that are designed and pursued for the primary 
purpose of diluting the votes held by the insurgent stockholders.”); see also Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. 
Benihana Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 189–90 (Del. Ch. 2005) (distinguishing Packer and Condec on grounds that in 
those cases, the share exchange did not bring in new capital, was negotiated in haste, and virtually assured the 
outcome of the vote). 
 134 Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 135 Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc., No. 9212, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 498, at *26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
16, 1987) (“I take it to be established in our law that it would ordinarily be found to constitute an abuse of 
power for a board of directors to issue stock, not for the principal purpose of raising necessary or desirable 
capital, but for the sole or primary purpose of diluting the voting power of an existing block of stock.”). 
 136 Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., No. 11713, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 257, at *27 n.16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 1993) 
(referring to parenthetical summarizing Phillips v. Insituform). 
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Mendel v. Carroll,137 while rejecting the plaintiff’s motion to force the 
issuance of a stock option that would dilute the controlling shareholder’s stake 
sufficiently for the other shareholders to accept an alternative transaction, the 
court left open the possibility that a board of directors might, when acting “in 
good faith and on the reasonable belief that a controlling shareholder is 
abusing its power and is exploiting or threatening to exploit the vulnerability of 
minority shareholders,”138 be justified in granting “an option to buy stock for 
the principal purpose of affecting the outcome of an expected shareholder 
action, such as an election, a consent solicitation, or a tender offer.”139 
Could one therefore argue, for example, that while § 251 gave Bear Stearns 
shareholders the right to vote on a merger, they were on notice that their shares 
could be diluted, and that, in extraordinary circumstances, even substantial 
dilution for the purpose of affecting the shareholder vote may be valid?  The 
problem that arises here, however, is that under existing Delaware case law, it 
is very difficult to see any legitimate basis for the Bear Stearns board’s attempt 
to deprive its existing shareholders of the ability to vote down the first $2 per 
share merger, and potentially reject the renegotiated $10 per share deal.  There 
was no claim that the Bear Stearns shareholders who were opposed to the J.P. 
Morgan transaction were motivated by anything other than their interest in 
maximizing the value of their Bear Stearns investment.  Bear Stearns may 
argue that it had to enter into the SEA, and thus lock up the deal, to induce J.P. 
Morgan to increase its offer from $2 to $10.  But the fact is that Delaware law 
requires shareholder approval for mergers, and so far Delaware courts have not 
embraced the argument that a board can effectively evade this shareholder 
approval requirement (by issuing a lockup block to one’s merger partner) as 
long as the merger premium is high enough and the merger partner insists on it.  
This is not to say that a Delaware court, faced with this case, could not have 
upheld the SEA on some ground.  Surely it could have.  But to do so would 
have significantly changed or destabilized existing Delaware doctrine. 
The second, somewhat newer line of Delaware cases, beginning with 
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries Inc.,140 continuing through Blasius,141 and 
reaffirmed in Stroud v. Grace142 and MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,143 
 
 137 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994). 
 138 Id. at 304. 
 139 Id. 
 140 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
 141 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 142 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). 
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consistently protects the shareholders’ franchise against board attempts to 
interfere with it.  As the Delaware Supreme Court stated, when “boards of 
directors deliberately employ[] . . . legal strategies either to frustrate or 
completely disenfranchise a shareholder vote . . . [t]here can be no dispute that 
such conduct violates Delaware law.”144  Such intentional interference, under 
Blasius and its progeny, is illegal even if the board acted in good faith unless it 
has a “compelling” justification.  This raises the question whether Blasius 
applies to the SEA and, if it does, whether the Bear Stearns board had the 
compelling justification needed to survive Blasius. 
As a threshold inquiry, one would have to resolve whether Blasius applied 
to the SEA.  It is clear that the SEA did, and was intended to, render the 
stockholder vote on the merger an empty formality, and thus fits squarely into 
the set of actions that constitute intentional interference with shareholders’ 
franchise.  What is less clear, however, is whether and how Blasius applies to 
shareholder votes other than elections for directors. 
Dicta in Blasius itself suggests that the standard applies to interference with 
any shareholder votes.145  But some recent Chancery Court opinions have tried 
to limit the Blasius standard to director elections.  Thus, in Mercier et al. v. 
Inter-Tel, Inc., Vice Chancellor Strine, as one alternative basis for the holding 
that a postponement of a merger vote was valid, held that Blasius never applied 
to merger votes.146  In another Chancery Court opinion involving a merger 
vote, Vice Chancellor Lamb held that Blasius applied only when self-interested 
or faithless fiduciaries act to deprive shareholders of a full and fair opportunity 
to participate in the matter and to thwart what appears to be the will of a 
majority of the shareholders.147  The court proceeded to uphold a board 
decision to change the record date for the merger because such a change did 
not deprive shareholders of a full and fair opportunity to participate in the 
merger vote.  By contrast, in State of Wisconsin Investment Board v. Peerless 
 
 143 813 A.2d 118 (Del. 2003). 
 144 Stroud, 606 A.2d at 91, cited and quoted with approval in Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1379 (Del 1995). 
 145 See, e.g., Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659–60 (“That is, a decision by the board to act for the primary purpose 
of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote inevitably involves the question who, as between the 
principal and the agent, has authority with respect to a matter of internal corporate governance.  That, of 
course, is true in a very specific way in this case which deals with the question who should constitute the board 
of directors of the corporation, but it will be true in every instance in which an incumbent board seeks to 
thwart a shareholder majority.”). 
 146 See, e.g., Mercier et al. v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 808–09 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that Blasius 
does not apply to a merger vote; in the alternative, Blasius’s compelling interest test is satisfied). 
 147 In re MONY Group, Inc., 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
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System Corp., Chancellor Chandler, after concluding that the board had acted 
with the “primary purpose [of] . . . interfer[ing] with the shareholder vote,” 
applied the Blasius standard to a vote on a shareholder proposal.148 
The upshot is that there is an unresolved conflict in the Chancery Court as 
to whether and how Blasius applies in the merger context.  Vice Chancellor 
Strine’s opinion in Mercier is in tension with the “compelling corporate 
purpose” language used in the share issuance cases discussed above in contexts 
that go well beyond elections of directors.  Under Chancellor Chandler’s and 
Vice Chancellor Lamb’s tests, whether Blasius would apply to the SEA, and 
how this understanding fits with the share issuance cases, is less clear.  Unlike 
a postponement of the record date upheld by Vice Chancellor Lamb, the SEA 
clearly deprived the other Bear Stearns shareholders of a full and fair 
opportunity to participate in the merger vote.  More problematic is whether the 
SEA was executed by self-interested or faithless fiduciaries.  While the Bear 
Stearns board seems to have had no conflict of interest, a board action that both 
intentionally interferes with the shareholder franchise and deprives 
stockholders of a full and fair opportunity to participate in the merger vote 
may, by itself, render the board faithless under Vice Chancellor Lamb’s and 
Chancellor Chandler’s tests.  As Chancellor Chandler stated in Peerless, “The 
fiduciary duty of loyalty between a board of directors and the shareholders of a 
corporation is always implicated where the board seeks to thwart the action of 
the company’s shareholders.”149  This is in keeping with the fundamental point 
of Blasius, namely, that a board, even in good faith, cannot intentionally 
interfere with shareholder franchise absent a compelling purpose.150 
Assuming Blasius does apply, there is little Delaware law on what 
circumstances could establish a compelling justification.  In Blasius itself, 
none was shown.  In dicta, Chancellor Allen suggested that the standard could 
possibly be met in a situation in which interfering with the shareholders’ 
franchise was necessary to protect the shareholders from coercion.151  
Similarly, in the later Delaware Supreme Court case of Liquid Audio,152 no 
compelling justification was shown and the issue of what may constitute a 
 
 148 No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000). 
 149 Id. at *44. 
 150 See generally Blasius, 564 A.2d 651. 
 151 There seem to be only two cases in which a compelling justification was found, and in each case, only 
in the alternative.  See Hollinger Int’l Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1089 (Del. Ch. 2004); Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d 
at 810. 
 152 MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). 
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compelling justification was not discussed.153  But even though there is little 
case law on what constitutes a compelling justification under Blasius, it clearly 
is meant to be a strict standard.  As Blasius itself holds, a good faith belief by 
directors to be acting in the best interest of the corporation is not enough.  And 
as a later Supreme Court case explains, the Blasius standard is very hard to 
meet.154 
What “compelling justifications” plausibly existed here for a device that 
effectively precluded shareholders from exercising their governance rights?  
One might argue that the magnitude of the increase from the original price to 
the amended merger price—from $2 per share to $10 per share—is so large as 
to create a compelling justification.  But this is a difficult claim to sustain 
because the increase is only large relative to the $2 price, not the recent market 
price or the trading price of the shares over the preceding year.  The fact that 
J.P. Morgan was so keen to lock up the deal at $10 per share, and had in fact 
paid up to $12.23 per share for additional shares in the market, likewise 
indicates that the price was not compellingly rich. 
What about the pressing need to close the deal to avoid a potential collapse 
of the financial system?  The discussion in Blasius, including Chancellor 
Allen’s hypothetical, suggests that compelling interests need to be compelling 
 
 153 Similarly, in an earlier case discussed in Blasius, Chancellor Allen had enjoined a board issuance of 
stock in an attempt to dilute the voting power of a controlling shareholder, holding that no justification for 
such an extraordinary step had been shown.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662; see also Phillips v. Insituform of N. 
Am., Inc., No. 9173, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 474 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987). 
 154 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) (“Blasius’ burden of demonstrating a 
‘compelling justification’ is quite onerous, and is therefore applied rarely.”).  The very stringency of the 
Blasius standard has limited its application, and has led courts to work hard to avoid characterizing actions as 
“disenfranchisement.”  Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 806 n.45 (citing Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 
1122–23 (Del. Ch. 1990)); see Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 
A.2d 293, 322–23 n.58 (Del. Ch. 2000); William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of 
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1314 n.107 (2001). 
  The one opinion running somewhat to the contrary is the recent Chancery Court case Inter-Tel, in 
which the board delayed a shareholder vote on a merger.  929 A.2d 786.  Vice Chancellor Strine held that 
Blasius did not apply to the board action.  Id. at 818.  He proceeded, however, to hold in the alternative that the 
board’s good faith action met the standard, at least as to a short delay, because the shareholders were about to 
act against their own interests, they had not had sufficient time to digest new information, and the acquirer 
would likely walk away if the shareholders voted no.  Id. at 819.  “When directors act for the purpose of 
preserving what the directors believe in good faith is a value-maximizing offer, they act for a compelling 
reason in the corporate context.”  Id.  The alternative holding in Inter-Tel has to be viewed in light of the 
peculiar nature of the board action, which amounted only to a small brake on the shareholders’ ability to take 
action, necessitated by the need to analyze new information, but which left the ultimate decision in the 
shareholders’ hands. 
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shareholder or corporate interests.155  To be sure, the Blasius compelling 
justification standard, undefined as it is, could include pressing national 
interests.  Whether it does, of course, represents another novel issue of 
Delaware law.  This being said, the notion that the board of directors is 
permitted, in the exercise of its fiduciary duties, to take into account not just 
the interest of the company’s shareholders, creditors, and other constituents, 
but the interests of parties who have no relationship whatsoever to the 
corporation is completely alien to Delaware law. 
But even if Blasius does not technically apply, it is unclear what follows.  
Some Delaware precedent suggests that even under Unocal/Unitrin, the same 
“compelling justification” test would apply.156  Thus, the Delaware Supreme 
Court stated in Stroud, “A board’s unilateral decision to adopt a defensive 
measure touching ‘upon issues of control’ that purposefully disenfranchises its 
shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without 
a ‘compelling justification.’”157  Whether this dictum in Stroud will be 
followed in other cases is yet another important question under Delaware law. 
D. The Best Argument in Support of the Deal: The “Zone of Insolvency” 
How, then, might the Amended Merger Agreement and the SEA be 
defended under Delaware law?  The strongest argument that could be made is 
that, because Bear Stearns was on the verge of insolvency, the independent and 
nonconflicted board had additional discretion to act to ensure that the 
corporation would be able to meet its obligations to its creditors, employees, 
and customers, even at some cost to shareholders.158  Going back at least to the 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp. case in 
1991, Delaware courts have made clear that when a corporation is operating 
“in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of 
the residue [sic: residual] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate 
enterprise.”159  In that case, the court held, the board had an obligation “to the 
community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in 
 
 155 See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (stating that the board may take certain steps “in good faith pursuit of a 
corporate interest”). 
 156 Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 810–11. 
 157 Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3. 
 158 See Prod. Res. Group L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004); Credit Lyonnais 
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); see also 
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 100 (Del. 2007) (citing and 
discussing Production Resources favorably). 
 159 Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 & n.55. 
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an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation’s long-term wealth 
creating capacity,”160 rather than merely to maximize the benefit to be obtained 
by the shareholders. 
As Vice Chancellor Strine explained in Production Resources Group, 
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., the Credit Lyonnais case, despite some of the 
scholarly commentary and a few court decisions, was not about expanding 
creditors’ rights or providing them with a new cause of action, but rather was 
about recognizing that the business judgment rule protects directors in 
choosing a less risky course of action: “In other words, Credit Lyonnais 
provided a shield to directors from stockholders who claimed that the directors 
had a duty to undertake extreme risk so long as the company would not 
technically breach any legal obligations.”161 
So, too, in the case of Bear Stearns, the board would argue that the firm 
was on the ropes; that the one chance to save it from bankruptcy was the deal 
with J.P. Morgan; that, although shareholders were understandably upset, there 
was really no alternative to the Amended Merger Agreement including the 
SEA; and that the doctrine announced in Credit Lyonnais would shield it from 
an attack by shareholders that it pursued an action that did not maximize 
shareholder benefit. 
This argument, however, seems somewhat misdirected in the Bear Stearns 
context.  First, a recent Delaware Supreme Court decision has clarified that the 
board’s duty shifts only when a corporation is actually insolvent.  As the court 
recently held: 
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, 
the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must 
continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best 
interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder 
owners.162 
Second, at least based on publicly available information, it is quite 
uncertain whether in fact Bear Stearns was insolvent (or, for that matter, within 
the zone of insolvency) on March 24, at the time of the Amended Merger 
 
 160 Id. at *109. 
 161 Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 788. 
 162 Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (emphasis added).  It should be noted that Gheewalla arose in the context 
of creditor standing and may not herald a retrenchment of Credit Lyonnais in the context of business judgment 
rule protection of board conduct. 
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Agreement.  The price J.P. Morgan paid (about $1.45 billion163), and J.P. 
Morgan’s eagerness to assure approval of the deal at that price, are both 
inconsistent with a claim of insolvency.164  The events leading up to the 
Amended Merger Agreement also cast factual doubt on a claim of insolvency.  
To be sure, on March 16, when the original Merger Agreement was signed, 
Bear Stearns was in dire straits: it faced a “run on the bank” and impending 
bankruptcy if its customers and counterparties could not be assured of its 
liquidity.165  But the March 16 deal, combined with the J.P. Morgan financing 
commitment and the Federal Reserve commitment to purchase $30 billion in 
illiquid securities from the previous Friday, provided sufficient liquidity for the 
company to continue doing business.166  As of March 17, therefore, the 
immediate liquidity crisis was averted, Bear Stearns’s stock price stabilized at 
about $5 per share,167 and the market attention turned from the impending 
collapse of the financial system to the merits of the J.P. Morgan deal.  The 
Amended Merger Agreement, with its $10 price for Bear Stearns, was the 
result of a belief that the Bear Stearns board had given the company away for 
too little and J.P. Morgan’s accompanying fear that shareholders would vote 
down the deal.168  If Bear Stearns had truly been insolvent at that point, a 
shareholder threat to vote against the $2 deal would not only have lacked 
credibility, it would not have induced J.P. Morgan to quintuple the offer price 
within the span of a few days. 
That the $2 deal negotiated on March 16 was a steal for J.P. Morgan, and 
that the $10 deal on March 24 was still pretty good, is also underlined by the 
stock price movements of J.P. Morgan.  On March 17, the first trading day 
after the $2 deal was announced, J.P. Morgan’s stock price increased by over 
10% from $36.54 to $40.31.169  Between March 17 and March 24, when the 
$10 deal was locked up, J.P. Morgan’s stock price increased by a further 15% 
 
 163 Bear Stearns Cos., Inc., Information Required in Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 3 (Mar. 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.t7p.htm#1stPage (145 million shares outstanding). 
 164 A positive share price, standing by itself, does not necessarily indicate that the company is not 
insolvent at the time.  Shareholders may hope for an improvement in the company’s fortunes before the 
creditors have to be paid, or to extract some value from even an insolvent entity through bargaining in 
bankruptcy.  In the context of Bear Stearns, however, it would be odd for a solvent company like J.P. Morgan 
to acquire Bear Stearns for $1.45 billion if Bear Stearns were insolvent. 
 165 See Kelly, Fears, supra note 14. 
 166 Kelly, Neared Collapse, supra note 14. 
 167 Bear Stearns—Stock Price History, MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/investor/charts/ 
chartdl.aspx?Symbol=BEAR STEARNS (last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
 168 See Kelly, Neared Collapse, supra note 14. 
 169 Id. 
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to $46.55.170  Over this period, the market capitalization of J.P. Morgan 
increased by $34 billion—surely a figure hard to square with the theory that 
J.P. Morgan had just spent $1.5 billion to acquire an insolvent company.171 
Third, the shareholders’ complaint is not that choosing the J.P. Morgan 
deal was, itself, a breach of the duty of care because it did not secure the 
highest price.  Rather, the claim is that the SEA interfered with shareholders’ 
governance rights—specifically, their statutory right to approve or reject a 
merger.  Indeed, in Credit Lyonnais, Chancellor Allen noted in a footnote, “But 
cf. Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., Del. Ch., 564 A.2d 651 (1988) (board 
action intended to impede stockholder exercise of statutory franchise right is 
suspect even if taken in good faith effort to promote corporate welfare).”172  
After all, shareholders’ right to approve or reject a merger is statutory, not 
simply an implication of the normal case of directors owing fiduciary duties to 
the corporation and its shareholders.  The board should not be permitted, under 
the guise of advancing the interest of the corporation and its creditors, to 
undermine this statutory right of the corporation’s shareholders. 
Indeed, Omnicare involved a firm on the brink of insolvency173 in which 
the controlling shareholders, acting in good faith and without conflict of 
interest, committed to a merger that assured that all creditors would get paid, 
and in which all shareholders were treated equally.  If a board were permitted 
to undermine shareholder voting rights for the good of the creditors of such a 
company, one would have expected the Delaware Supreme Court to have 
awarded the Omnicare directors a medal.  Instead, the Delaware Supreme 
Court enjoined the voting agreements because they undermined the 
shareholder vote, rendering it a mere fait accompli.  It is extremely hard to see 
how a judge could uphold the SEA on the zone of insolvency theory without 
first overruling Omnicare—which, despite its flaws, remains binding on the 
Delaware Chancery Court (as well as on any foreign court applying Delaware 
law). 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 The S&P 500 index slightly declined on March 17 and increased by less than 5% between March 17 
and March 24.  S&P 500 Index—Price History (Mar. 17–Mar. 24, 2008), MSN Money, http://moneycentral. 
msn.com/investor/charts/chartdl.aspx?symbol=SPY (enter date range as March 17, 2008, to March 24, 2008; 
then click on “Redraw Chart”) (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 172 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, *109 
n.56 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 173 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
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Upholding the SEA on the basis that Bear Stearns was nearly or actually 
insolvent when it was entered into, and that this potential insolvency permits 
the board to ride roughshod over shareholders’ governance rights, thus raises a 
host of factual and doctrinal difficulties.  While this may be the best of the 
several bad ways to uphold the SEA, it would not present an easy way out for 
Delaware courts. 
E. The Forty Percent Exception 
Another even less persuasive argument could be made in support of the 
SEA.  One defense can be discerned in some newspaper reports.  The New 
York Times reported: 
In an unusual move, Bear’s board was seeking to authorize the sale 
of 39.5 percent of the firm to J.P. Morgan in an effort to move closer 
to majority shareholder approval.  Under state law in Delaware, 
where the companies are incorporated, a company can sell up to 40 
percent without shareholder approval.174 
In another account, it was said that 
takeover practitioners have generally advised that as long as a deal 
was theoretically possible, Omnicare wasn’t implicated.  Delaware 
practitioners have settled on the “40 percent rule” to set a limit on 
how high you could go on a lock-up.  Hence the 39.5 percent figure 
in Monday’s deal with Bear.175 
To start with, the first report was incorrect when it referred to a forty 
percent rule in Delaware law.  Rather, as the second quote correctly reports, 
this refers to a practitioners’ rule of thumb with regard to the applicability of 
Omnicare.  As discussed above, in Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that locking up the votes of 60% of the shares impermissibly rendered 
merger approval a fait accompli.  But what percentage of the votes can be 
locked up without triggering Omnicare?  The case, of course, did not say. 
If one reads Omnicare as holding that you cannot lock up a “controlling” 
percentage of the votes—a reasonable reading as, in Omnicare, it was the votes 
of the controlling shareholders that were locked up and that rendered the 
outcome a fait accompli—then the business planner’s question becomes “What 
 
 174 Andrew Ross Sorkin, J.P. Morgan in Negotiations to Raise Bear Stearns Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2008, at A1. 
 175 Steven Davidoff, Is JPMorgan Getting Too Clever?, N.Y. Times Deal Book: The Deal Professor (Mar. 
24, 2008), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/is-J.P.Morgan-getting-too-clever. 
KAHANROCK GALLEYSFLIPS 3/12/2009  8:01:14 AM 
2009] BEAR STEARNS, DELAWARE, & THE STRATEGIC USE OF COMITY 743 
is the minimum percentage that gives control?”  Here, the answer based on the 
existing cases is that, while there are a variety of cases in a variety of contexts 
finding control between 40% and 50% of the shares, there are no cases finding 
control below 40%.176 
But, as a defense of the SEA, this is a pretty weak argument.  First, 
Omnicare and the related case law all involved shareholders who already 
owned a controlling position.  By contrast, in Bear Stearns, it is the Bear 
Stearns board, through the SEA, that unilaterally gave J.P. Morgan its 
overwhelming stock holding.  Second, the notion that anything short of 40% 
does not amount to a fait accompli may be practitioner lore but it is not 
Delaware law (notwithstanding a single opinion by a respected judge).  Third, 
there is no suggestion in the case law that one can issue up to 40% of the 
company’s stock in a lockup without running afoul of Unocal/Unitrin.  Fourth, 
and most importantly, under the SEA, J.P. Morgan was permitted to, and did, 
acquire far more than 40%: it immediately purchased another 5% of Bear 
Stearns stock and then raised its stake to 49.73% of the outstanding shares over 
the next few weeks—a level which gave de facto control.177 
F. Summary 
In the end, therefore, we believe that to uphold the SEA, the Delaware 
courts would have had to engage in significant factual or doctrinal contortions.  
Even if Blasius did not apply, a conclusion that could be reached on existing 
precedent, the SEA would have had to survive Unocal/Unitrin, Omnicare, and 
Condec.  To get there, the courts could either have overruled Omnicare (as 
 
 176 Thus, for example, in management buyout cases in which the question is whether the Kahn v. Lynch 
entire fairness standard applies, 40% seems to be the lower bound.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 
1110 (Del. 1994).  In Kahn, Alcatel owned 43.3% of Lynch’s outstanding stock and was, in fact, restricted to 
appointing a minority of the directors of Lynch.  Id. at 1112.  In In re Cysive, the shareholding group, 
depending on how you counted shares and options, had somewhere between 41% and 44% ownership, which, 
according to the court, was sufficient to trigger entire fairness.  In re Cysive, Inc., 836 A.2d 531, 535 (Del. Ch. 
2003).  By contrast, in In re Western National, 46% ownership was not enough to trigger entire fairness.  In re 
W. Nat’l Corp., 2000 WL 710192, at *29 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000). 
  There are other cases that are consistent with this 40% line.  For example, in IXC, then-Vice 
Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Steele, who dissented in Omnicare, held that agreements locking up 40% of 
the votes did not “make the outcome of the vote a foregone conclusion.”  In re IXC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 
17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).  In ACE v. Capital Re, a case involving a topping 
bid and the question whether Capital Re should be enjoined from talking with the competing bidder, the fact 
that ACE controlled nearly 46% of the shares outstanding going into the merger vote counted strongly toward 
interpreting the merger agreement to permit Capital Re to talk with other potential bidders.  ACE Ltd. v. 
Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 111 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 177 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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noted, it was a split opinion and widely criticized) or limited it to instances in 
which the controlling shareholder had an actual majority (and not just 49.7%) 
of the stock.  In addition, the courts would have had to hold that a 39.5% share 
issuance, coupled with no restrictions on further acquisitions, and accompanied 
by an actual purchase of another 10% of the stock within days or weeks, was 
not a preclusive and coercive device—a ruling that would not only be 
ridiculous, but which would greatly expand the permissible scope of defensive 
devices.  Alternatively, the courts could have found that the special 
circumstances of the case—the national interest—permitted the board to 
engage in conduct that would otherwise violate its fiduciary duties, which 
would have introduced a novel and alien concept into Delaware corporate law.  
Or they could have found that, despite J.P. Morgan’s eagerness to acquire Bear 
Stearns for $1.5 billion, Bear Stearns was insolvent, and held, as a matter of 
first impression (and at least implicitly inconsistent with Omnicare and dicta in 
Credit Lyonnais), that the board of an insolvent company can coerce 
shareholders into approving a deal that it finds in the overall best interest of 
shareholders and creditors.  Such a resolution, in our view, would be 
questionable both on the interpretation of the facts and in the merits of the new 
doctrine it would create, but could still have been the least bad of the ways to 
uphold the SEA. 
III.  DELAWARE’S DILEMMA 
The Amended Merger Agreement and the SEA thus placed Delaware on 
the horns of a dilemma.  On the one hand, the SEA was pretty clearly invalid 
under current Delaware law.  On the other hand, how could Delaware even 
contemplate enjoining a transaction that was supported, indeed, arguably 
driven and financed by the Federal Reserve with the full support of the 
Treasury—a transaction that may have been necessary to prevent a collapse of 
the international financial system?  What would happen if a Delaware court 
enjoined the merger?  Would the Federal Reserve or the Treasury or the 
defendants seek to remove the case to federal court (on some theory)?  How 
could little Delaware insist on shareholders’ right to veto a merger when so 
much depended on the merger’s approval?  Suppose that Delaware enjoined 
the merger, Bear Stearns failed, and the international financial system did, in 
fact, collapse.  While upholding the SEA would involve a host of problems, 
risking the collapse of the financial system by invalidating the SEA could 
provoke exactly the kind of attention to Delaware’s lack of political legitimacy 
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that would induce doubts about Delaware’s ability to handle its role as maker 
of national corporate law—a severe threat to Delaware’s franchising business. 
This was the dilemma that faced Vice Chancellor Donald Parsons when he 
was assigned the Delaware portion of the Bear Stearns litigation.178  As the 
earlier timeline indicated, on March 17 and 18, four separate class actions were 
filed in New York, with a fifth filed on March 20.  On March 20 and 24 (the 
day that the Amended Merger Agreement and SEA were announced), two 
class actions were filed in Delaware.  On March 27, the defendants moved to 
stay the Delaware action in favor of the New York actions.179  In this Part, we 
first discuss the general approach Delaware has taken in deciding whether to 
stay an action involving Delaware corporate law.  We then turn to Vice 
Chancellor Parson’s ruling in the Bear Stearns case. 
A. Delaware’s Role in Adjudicating Delaware Corporate Law 
In deciding whether to stay a Delaware action, Delaware considers a 
variety of factors.  When the Delaware action is the only action filed and the 
stay is sought on the grounds of forum non conveniens, Delaware rarely grants 
such relief.180  When a parallel action has been filed in another court, Delaware 
first examines whether the Delaware action was filed first, the other action was 
 
 178 In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
9, 2008). 
 179 There is a separate and interesting question as to why the defendants preferred a New York forum.  
From a purely doctrinal perspective, they would be better off in Delaware.  As discussed above, the case that 
presented the most serious obstacle to the validity of the SEA was Omnicare, a 3–2 decision of the Delaware 
Supreme Court.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).  In a Delaware forum, one 
could argue that Omnicare was wrongly decided and should be overruled.  For example, in Optima 
International of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc., Vice Chancellor Lamb characterized Omnicare as being “of 
questionable continued vitality.”  Recent Delaware Corporate Law Decisions and the 2008 Amendments to the 
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, DE), July 31, 
2008, http://www.rlf.com/richardsnews/corpNewsletter073108-1.html.  No opinion was written in that case.  
On the other hand, because there have been no Delaware Supreme Court opinions casting any doubt on 
Omnicare’s validity, it is hard to see the basis by which a New York forum could do anything other than take 
Omnicare as stating current Delaware law—without any way to take judicial notice of the controversy over 
Omnicare’s continued validity. 
  Only a Delaware chancellor, with a full and confident grasp of Delaware doctrine and experience 
adjudicating high stakes corporate battles, would have had the self-confidence even to consider enjoining such 
a merger.  See, e.g., In re IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) (ordering specific 
performance of a $3 billion merger); Scott Kilman & Robin Sidel, Judge Rules Against Tyson in IBP Takeover 
Case, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2001, at A3.  Our guess is that it was this consideration that ultimately drove the 
defendants’ decision to seek adjudication in a New York forum. 
 180 McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 n.2 (Del. 1970). 
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filed first, or the cases were filed contemporaneously.181  Delaware considers 
cases filed within a few days of each other to have been filed 
contemporaneously.182 
When the non-Delaware action was filed first, Delaware applies the 
McWane test.183  Under McWane, a decision to grant a stay should be exercised 
freely in favor of a prior action so long as that action involves the same parties 
and issues and the other court is capable of doing prompt and complete 
justice.184 
In contrast, when the two actions were filed contemporaneously or the 
Delaware action was filed first, a Delaware court will use the forum non 
conveniens factors in deciding whether to stay the action.185  In that analysis, 
Delaware will consider the standard factors: 
1) the applicability of Delaware law, 2) the relative ease of access to 
proof, 3) the availability of compulsory process for witnesses, 4) the 
pendency or non-pendency of a similar action or actions in another 
jurisdiction, 5) the possibility of a need to view the premises; and 
6) all other practical considerations that would make the trial easy, 
expeditious, and inexpensive.186 
This doctrinal framework governs stay motions in Delaware generally, 
regardless of whether the case involves Delaware corporate law or other 
matters.187  However, in cases involving Delaware corporate law, the factors 
play out differently.  Our review of stay decisions in corporate law cases 
decided in the last five years reveals the following pattern: 
(i) When the non-Delaware action was filed first and the action 
relates to a corporation that is not publicly traded, Delaware will 
generally stay the Delaware action;188 
 
 181 See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *2. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See McWane, 263 A.2d at 283. 
 184 Id.; see Adirondack GP, Inc. v. Am. Power Corp., No. 15060, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 143, at *18–*19 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 1996). 
 185 In re Bear Stearns, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *16. 
 186 Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 351 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting In re Chambers Dev. Co., Inc., No. 
12508, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1993)); see also In re Bear Stearns, 2008 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 46, at *16. 
 187 See Aveta, Inc. v. Colón, 942 A.2d 603, 609 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 188 See, e.g., Citrin Holdings LLC v. Cullen 130 LLC, No. 2791-VCN, 2008 WL 241615, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
July 18, 2007). 
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(ii) When the non-Delaware action was filed first but the action 
relates to a publicly traded corporation, Delaware will sometimes 
issue a stay (when special facts would make it inefficient to 
proceed in Delaware189) and sometimes not;190 and 
(iii) When the actions were filed contemporaneously or the Delaware 
action was filed first, Delaware will generally not issue a stay, 
especially if the action involves a publicly traded corporation.191 
Within the last category, we found three actions involving public 
corporations.  In each case, Delaware refused to stay the Delaware action.192  
We found one action involving a nonpublic corporation in which Delaware 
issued a stay,193 but that case involved two unusual facts.  First, the same party 
instituted two actions in different courts.194  Thus, the stay did not deprive the 
party instituting the Delaware action of its choice of forum.195  Second, only 
the non-Delaware forum (Pennsylvania) had personal jurisdiction over one of 
the key defendants, who had been dismissed from the Delaware action for lack 
of jurisdiction.196 
When a Delaware court refuses to issue a stay, it frequently bases its 
decision on the first of the forum non conveniens factors, the applicability of 
Delaware law, and sometimes notes the importance of Delaware courts 
developing their case law, especially when the issues raised in the case are 
 
 189 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Kumar, No. 2418-VCL, 2007 WL 1765617, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 8, 2007) (New 
York action filed two years before Delaware’s); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Scrushy, No. 20529, 2004 WL 
423122, at *1–*2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 2004) (Delaware action filed after plaintiffs in Alabama state and federal 
courts, together with plaintiffs in a prior Delaware action, had reached agreement on appointment of a steering 
committee, appointment of lead counsel, and supervised settlement discussions); Brudno v. Wise, No. 19953, 
2003 WL 1874750, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2003) (staying Delaware action where derivative Delaware claim 
hinged on the outcome of a securities claim in federal action and the federal courts had stayed the federal 
derivative action pending the disposition of the securities claim). 
 190 See, e.g., Ryan, 918 A.2d at 349–50 (no stay because action involved novel and substantive issue of 
Delaware corporate law); Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1160–61 (Del. Ch. 2003) (no stay because 
previously filed complaint was cursorily pled). 
 191 See, e.g., Brandin v. Deason, 941 A.2d 1020, 1021 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 
924 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. Ch. 2007); Rapoport v. Litig. Trust of MDIP Inc., No. 1035-N, 2005 WL 3277911, at 
*8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005). 
 192 Brandin, 941 A.2d at 1021; In re Topps, 924 A.2d at 953; Rapoport, 2005 WL 3277911, at *8. 
 193 Cornerstone Techs., LLC v. Conrad, No. 19712-NC, 2003 WL 1787959, at *14–*15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
31, 2003). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
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novel and substantial.197  Thus, for example, in Ryan v. Gifford, Chancellor 
Chandler denied a motion to stay an option-backdating case in favor of an 
earlier-filed case pending in federal court and held that 
A similarly important factor in determining whether a stay is 
appropriate in a derivative action is a court’s ability to render justice.  
Rendering justice necessarily entails accurately applying controlling 
law, in this case Delaware law.  In many instances, this Court has 
recognized without hesitation that sister state courts and federal 
courts are capable of applying Delaware law and providing complete 
justice to parties.  At the same time, however, Delaware courts have a 
“significant and substantial interest in overseeing the conduct of 
those owing fiduciary duties to shareholders of Delaware 
corporations.”  This interest increases greatly in actions addressing 
novel issues.  In In re Chambers Development Co., this Court noted, 
as it has in the past, that “novel and substantial issues of Delaware 
corporate law are best resolved in Delaware courts.”  Thus, while the 
application of Delaware law in most cases is not determinative, more 
weight must be accorded to this factor where the law is novel.  Such 
is the case here.198 
Note that Delaware has taken a fairly broad view of what constitutes a novel or 
substantial issue.  Thus, in Rapoport v. Litigation Trust of MDIP Inc., Vice 
Chancellor Parsons found that the 
action will likely raise at least one novel issue of Delaware corporate 
law: whether directors and officers’ duties change materially in the 
face of “deepening insolvency.”  This action also raises “substantial 
issues” of Delaware corporate law.  Indeed, the liability or lack 
thereof of the Directors will turn on their compliance with their 
duties of good faith and loyalty, as elucidated by the Delaware 
courts.199 
The Delaware practice we have described, we believe, reflects a view of the 
proper scope of Delaware jurisdiction held not only by the Delaware judiciary, 
but also shared by the corporate litigation bar and corporate law academics.  
This view takes as a starting point that publicly traded companies incorporate 
in Delaware (and pay its high franchise taxes) at least in part because of its 
 
 197 MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., No. 8126, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 545, at *4–*5 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1985), cited in In re Chambers Dev. Co., No. 12508, 1993 WL 179335, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 
20, 1993). 
 198 Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349–50 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 199 Rapoport v. Litigation Trust of MDIP Inc., No. 1035-N, 2005 WL 3277911, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 
2005) (citations omitted). 
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high-quality and specialized courts and, as a general matter, want important 
and high-profile cases to be decided by Delaware judges.  The Delaware court 
system rests on a highly respected Chancery Court that decides cases without 
juries and specializes in corporate law adjudication, combined with a Supreme 
Court that offers quick review and brings its own considerable  
expertise—three of the five current Delaware Supreme Court justices are 
former members of the Chancery Court, and all regularly hear appeals from the 
Chancery Court on corporate law issues.  The Delaware Supreme Court and 
Chancery Court judges are not only experts, but are few in number and 
communicate regularly with each other and members of the corporate bar.  In 
such a system, much of the shared understanding of Delaware doctrine resides 
between the lines of the judicial opinions. 
Compounding these aspects of the court system, Delaware corporate law 
doctrine regularly employs open-ended, highly fact-specific standards that are 
difficult to apply by any judge who does not regularly adjudicate corporate law 
disputes.200  It is a doctrine that works well for the Delaware courts—because 
of the volume of cases and the small number and expertise of its judges—but 
much less so if judges of other courts are asked to apply it.  As a result, any 
issue arising under Delaware corporate law where the correct outcome is not 
obvious is best decided by Delaware’s judiciary. 
Indeed, despite the fact that Delaware courts pay lip service to the ability of 
other courts to decide Delaware corporate law cases (and let them decide cases 
involving nonpublic corporations that are usually low profile and unimportant 
to the development of Delaware doctrine), the fundamental view that non-
Delaware judges should not decide important issues under Delaware corporate 
law is occasionally revealed.  Thus, again in Rapoport, Vice Chancellor 
Parsons explained that “[s]uch questions of substantive Delaware corporate 
law ‘are more properly decided here rather than another jurisdiction.’”201  In 
Brandin, Vice Chancellor Lamb, after first noting that “federal courts are quite 
capable of deciding cases involving Delaware corporate law,” 202 proceeded to 
quote then-U.S. Supreme Court Justice White for the proposition that federal 
courts would have “the unavoidable tendency . . . ‘to depart from state 
fiduciary standards at least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity within 
 
 200 See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 1009, 1102 (1997). 
 201 Rapoport, 2005 WL 3277911, at *5 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co., No. 15452, 1997 WL 118402, at 
*3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 1997)). 
 202 Brandin v. Deason, 941 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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the federal system.’”203  And in another notable case, In re Topps Co., Vice 
Chancellor Strine noted that in Delaware, only 
ten judges are involved in [corporate law] decisions, avoiding 
phenomena such as “circuit splits” and expressed concern that the 
important coherence-generating benefits created by [the Delaware 
judiciary] . . . are endangered if . . . decisions are instead routinely 
made by a variety of state and federal judges who only deal 
episodically with our law.204 
In case someone missed the point, he then quoted at length from an article by 
our colleague Bob Thompson praising the Delaware courts for the unmatched 
coherence of Delaware’s fiduciary duty law.205 
The refusal by Vice Chancellor Strine to stay the Delaware action in Topps 
is especially noteworthy because, as in the Bear Stearns case, the 
non-Delaware action was pending in the New York Supreme Court in front of 
Justice Cahn.206  Despite Vice Chancellor Strine’s suggestion that New York 
respect Delaware’s superior interest and stay its action—including a quote 
from Judge Learned Hand, “one of New York’s most distinguished jurists,” 
that “‘when a trial involve[s] the internal affairs of a corporation, the rule is 
that the courts of a foreign forum will not assume jurisdiction over it’”207—
Justice Cahn refused to issue a stay.208  He held that, under New York law, 
when the action was filed in New York first—even if only by a day—and New 
York has a substantial nexus with the case, New York should never stay, even 
in favor of the state of incorporation.209  For Justice Cahn, then, a decision to 
incorporate in Delaware did not reflect a choice by the corporation and its 
shareholders of Delaware as the preferred forum for adjudicating corporate law 
disputes which should be accorded significant weight. 
Justice Cahn’s reasoning has the potential to significantly undermine 
Delaware’s ability to resolve disputes.  In virtually every dispute, another state 
will have a stronger factual nexus to the action than Delaware’s.  After all, 
Delaware is rarely the state in which companies are headquartered, financial 
 
 203 Id. (quoting Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)). 
 204 In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 959 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 205 See id. at 958 n.24 (quoting Robert V. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the 
Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV. 619, 628 (2005)). 
 206 In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8973, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
June 8, 2007). 
 207 In re Topps Co., 924 A.2d at 959 (quoting Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
 208 In re Topps Co., 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8973, at *7. 
 209 Id. 
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advisors are located, deals are negotiated, board meetings are held, or the key 
documents and witnesses are located.  Indeed, given New York’s status as the 
financial capital, most cases will have a stronger nexus to New York than to 
Delaware.  Were Justice Cahn’s reasoning accepted, no case would be 
adjudicated in Delaware when a non-Delaware action had been filed one day 
(or even one hour) before the Delaware action. 
Delaware’s ability to rule on cases raising questions of Delaware corporate 
law is a matter of enormous consequence to Delaware.  In the short term, 
reducing Delaware’s ability to rule on such cases would diminish its 
attractiveness as the state of incorporation and reduce the income of 
Delaware’s corporate litigation bar, an important political constituency.  In the 
long term, the consequences would be even more drastic.  Delaware law would 
be less developed (due to the smaller number of cases), possibly become less 
coherent (due to the presence of decisions decided by other courts), and its 
judiciary could lose part of its expertise (due to the smaller number of cases 
heard).  From Delaware’s perspective, Justice Cahn’s approach constitutes a 
virtual declaration of war on its corporate law adjudication. 
B. The Delaware Motion for a Stay 
As a matter of Delaware law and practice, therefore, it would have been 
quite straightforward for Vice Chancellor Parsons to deny the motion to stay.  
After all, this was a case in which the parties themselves, in the Amended 
Merger Agreement and the SEA, had explicitly contracted for Delaware law 
and a Delaware forum.210  Moreover, as the discussion above shows, the case 
presented questions at least as novel and substantive as those cited in prior 
cases as justification for a refusal to issue a stay.  Thus, a refusal to stay this 
high-profile case involving a publicly traded corporation would be consistent 
with the intention of the parties, with Delaware doctrine, and with Delaware’s 
past practice.  By contrast, yielding to Justice Cahn’s assertion of New York 
adjudicative authority in a case involving the internal affairs of a Delaware 
corporation would not be a viable long-term strategy for Delaware. 
But Vice Chancellor Parsons stayed the Delaware action.  In doing so, he 
made several arguments.  First, he stated: 
 
 210 Bear Stearns Cos. Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K, Exh. 2.1), at 38 (Mar. 24, 2008), 
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.t8b.d.htm#1stPage; March 24 Exhibit, supra note 80, at 7–8. 
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Despite Plaintiffs’ protestations to the contrary, the claims asserted in 
the Complaint only require the application of well-settled principles 
of Delaware law to evaluate the deal protections in the merger and 
the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.  There is no dispute that these 
principles will be applied by some court.  Although the facts of the 
case are unusual, the uniqueness of facts does not transform settled 
law into new or novel legal issues.211 
This, we assert, is disingenuous.  Some of the relevant principles are hardly 
settled: the split decision in Omnicare is one of the most controversial opinions 
to be issued by the Delaware Supreme Court in years; the applicability of 
Blasius to merger cases is unresolved; the scope of the “compelling 
justification” exception under Blasius is almost completely undefined; and the 
scope and content of a zone of insolvency defense is especially unclear in light 
of the recent Gheewalla case.  And even with respect to purportedly settled 
principles, this case raised the question of whether a court should unsettle those 
principles to permit a transaction to proceed which is arguably necessary to 
maintain the stability of the financial system and, if so, on what basis and with 
what limits.  One might think that the expert Delaware judiciary should decide 
these questions. 
Vice Chancellor Parsons then added: 
Moreover, several facts make it unlikely this extraordinary situation 
will recur or have wide application.  Indeed, Christopher Cox, 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in reported 
testimony before a Congressional Committee characterized Bear 
Stearns’ failure to obtain financing even though it had “high quality 
collateral” as “an unprecedented occurrence.”212 
This, we submit, is a makeweight.  The fact that it was unprecedented did not 
mean that it would not recur.  Subsequent events—the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the government bailouts of AIG, GM, and Chrysler—reveal that 
the Bear Stearns matter, while perhaps unprecedented, was not unique.  
Subsequent developments further emphasize the importance of the core issue 
presented for Delaware corporations: to what extent may dire circumstances 
justify a board’s good faith usurpation of shareholders’ statutory right to 
approve a merger by issuing a large block of shares to a merger partner? 
 
 211 In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *21 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 9, 2008). 
 212 Id. at *21–*22 (citation omitted). 
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As yet another basis for the stay, Vice Chancellor Parsons asserted: 
That is not to say . . . that the issues of Delaware law presented 
by this dispute are not important; in fact, such issues ordinarily 
would be heard in this Court.  Rather, I find the circumstances of this 
case to be sui generis.  What is paramount is that this Court not 
contribute to a situation that might cause harm to a number of 
affected constituencies, including U.S. taxpayers and citizens, by 
creating the risk of greater uncertainty.213 
The logic of this argument is somewhat unclear.  The procedural posture of the 
case, with parallel actions filed in two fora, is common and surely not sui 
generis.  What makes this case sui generis is the significance of the Bear 
Stearns–J.P. Morgan transaction for the stability of the financial system.  But if 
this aspect of the case is legally irrelevant—if the outcome under Delaware law 
is not and should not be affected by it—then the fact that this aspect is sui 
generis should also have no impact on the decision to stay.  After all, each case 
involves facts that are sui generis in some sense, yet legally irrelevant.  If, on 
the other hand, this aspect is, or is arguably, legally relevant, then the case 
raises novel issues and therefore cannot be governed by well-settled principles 
of Delaware law.  And the presence of novel issues is a factor that, under 
Delaware stay jurisprudence, would weigh heavily in favor of having the case 
heard in a Delaware court. 
Moreover, it is unclear why a failure to stay the case would create the risk 
of greater uncertainty.  First, of course, this presupposes that New York would 
proceed with the case despite Delaware’s failure to stay.  In Topps, Vice 
Chancellor Strine refused a stay and left New York to decide for itself what to 
do.214  In Bear Stearns, Vice Chancellor Parsons might have done the same 
thing. 
But even assuming that Justice Cahn would not stay the New York action, 
proceeding in two fora rather than one does not materially increase 
uncertainty.  The issue here arises at the intersection between parallel 
representative litigation, the U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit 
 
 213 Id. at *23. 
 214 See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 956 (Del. Ch. 2007).  The New York court denied 
the defendants’ motion for a stay.  In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
8973, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007). 
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Clause,215 and the parallel federal Full Faith and Credit Statute.216  Before final 
judgment, rulings of one court do not bind a court of a sister state.217  By 
contrast, after a final judgment, straightforward application of the rule of res 
judicata generally bars the relitigation of the case in the sister state’s court.218  
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Statute, and the 
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,219 if applicable, provide 
additional compulsion to respect the first judgment.220  This set of rules has the 
obvious effect of providing an incentive for a race in which the first judgment 
will prevail against all subsequent judgments in parallel proceedings.221 
Within this framework, the most significant result of parallel Delaware and 
New York proceedings is to increase the likelihood of an injunction by giving 
plaintiffs the proverbial two bites at the apple: an injunction in either court will 
be binding on the parties, and a refusal to grant an injunction in either court 
will not bind the other court, because it is not a final judgment.  This is 
presumably the main reason why J.P. Morgan wanted to stay the Delaware 
action.  There is thus a limited and trivial sense in which a stay increases 
certainty: with a stay, J.P. Morgan only needs to win in New York; without a 
stay, J.P. Morgan must win in both New York and Delaware. 
But even the possibility of conflicting rulings is more imagined than real.  
If Delaware were to rule first on the preliminary injunction motion (as it was 
urged to do by the plaintiffs during the oral argument on the stay222), it would 
take quite a bit of chutzpah for the New York trial court to correct the 
 
 215 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”). 
 216 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (requiring state courts to give judicial proceedings of other states “the same 
full faith and credit . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are 
taken”); see William T. Allen, Finality of Judgments in Class Actions: A Comment on Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1155–56 (1998); Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
514, 533–34 (1996). 
 217 See Miller, supra note 216, at 523–25. 
 218 Id. at 525–26.  Two principal exceptions apply: absent class members who have not had adequate 
notice and right to opt out, Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), and absent class members who 
can show that they were not adequately represented by class counsel in an initial proceeding, Miller, supra 
note 216, at 526.  For a full discussion of these issues, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and 
Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2117–31 (2008). 
 219 UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 2, 13 U.L.A. 152 (1986). 
 220 Miller, supra note 216, at 526. 
 221 Id. at 527. 
 222 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 
2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008).  If Delaware enjoined the SEA, the injunction motion in 
New York would become moot. 
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Delaware Chancery Court (or the Delaware Supreme Court, if it had affirmed) 
on its application of Delaware law to the facts at bar.  Moreover, if one accepts 
the premise that Delaware courts are more likely to decide the case correctly, 
and further believes that the earlier Delaware ruling will affect any subsequent 
New York ruling, Delaware’s decision to stay merely increased the likelihood 
of an incorrect outcome by letting New York proceed without first hearing the 
views of the Delaware Chancery Court. 
But what if New York were to rule first or make a decision without regard 
to the prior Delaware ruling?  Even then, a Delaware stay would affect the 
outcome only if Delaware would have granted the injunction and New York 
would not have granted one.  (If New York would have granted an injunction, 
or if neither New York nor Delaware would have granted one, a Delaware stay 
would have no effect on the outcome.)  In this specific circumstance, to be 
sure, a Delaware stay reduces the likelihood of the SEA being enjoined and 
benefits J.P. Morgan.  But from a broader perspective, and assuming again that 
Delaware is more likely to decide the case correctly, a Delaware stay raises the 
likelihood of an incorrect ruling in this specific circumstance as well as in the 
case in which a prior Delaware ruling would affect the New York ruling.  This 
combined effect—a lower likelihood of an injunction and a higher likelihood 
of an incorrect ruling—seems desirable to us only if one believes that it is 
more important to have the merger consummated than to arrive at the correct 
legal outcome. 
Finally, Vice Chancellor Parsons noted: 
[T]his case raises practical considerations far beyond the typical 
concerns.  The practical considerations here include: two sets of 
plaintiffs in two fora; the risk that inconsistent rulings would 
negatively impact not only the parties involved, but also the U.S. 
financial markets and the national economy; and the involvement of 
unusual third party players, including, inter alia, the Federal Reserve 
Bank and the Department of the Treasury.  Given these important 
and atypical practical considerations, this is the rare case where a 
stay may be appropriate.223 
But this explanation is problematic.  Stay motions often involve two sets of 
plaintiffs in two fora.  That this case is highly important for the economy, as 
indicated by the involvement of Federal Reserve and Treasury officials, means 
not just that one should avoid the risk of inconsistent rulings (which, as 
 
 223 In re Bear Stearns, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *28 (citations omitted). 
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explained before, is not so severe to start with and could be managed by having 
Delaware rule first), but that it is very important to get the case resolved 
correctly.  Moreover, getting a difficult Delaware corporate law case resolved 
correctly is a factor that weighs heavily toward having it resolved by the 
Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court, and not within the New York state 
court system.  At most, this argument supports an expedited schedule in 
Delaware. 
Nevertheless, Vice Chancellor Parsons, when presented by the defendants 
with an opportunity to defer to another state, embraced it.  And, in doing so, 
we argue, he made the right strategic decision for Delaware.  The Bear Stearns 
dilemma placed Delaware in an impossible position.  While it clearly could 
not—as a matter of prudent public policy and Realpolitik—enjoin the merger, 
upholding the SEA would have raised a host of its own problems.  How to 
avoid the horns of the dilemma?  Delaware hit on the perfect solution: avoid 
any decision at all! 
By taking advantage of the pendency of actions in New York and the 
defendants’ motion to stay, and by invoking the doctrine of comity to allow a 
New York trial court judge to decide a pure question of Delaware corporate 
law, Delaware managed to dodge both bullets.  On the one hand, it could 
predict that the New York judge would not enjoin the transaction for a similar 
set of reasons that would lead Delaware to refrain from enjoining such a deal.  
On the other hand, any decision approving the merger would have no 
precedential value in Delaware and thus would not disturb its case law.224  And 
if the New York court were to distort the facts to reach such a decision, it 
would matter even less for Delaware. 
Moreover, this strategy trumps the alternative ways of ducking the 
question.  For example, Vice Chancellor Parsons could have refused to enjoin 
the vote and waited to see if J.P. Morgan’s shares proved pivotal to the 
outcome.  But what if, but for the J.P. Morgan shares, the merger did not 
receive shareholder approval (as in fact turned out to be the case)?225  Then he 
would have been stuck.  Alternatively, he might have played for time, hoping 
the case would settle or otherwise go away.  But this strategy would have at 
 
 224 As Gil Sparks, a leading Delaware lawyer representing Bear Stearns, argued to Vice Chancellor 
Parsons, “a preliminary ruling by a foreign court on Delaware law questions won’t reshape our law.  That is 
done by this Court and by our Supreme Court.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, In re Bear Stearns, 2008 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 46. 
 225 In re Bear Stearns Litig., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7075, at **18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 4, 2008) (not 
counting the J.P. Morgan shares, the merger would have failed with a 42.7% vote). 
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least two further downsides: first, the settlement value would depend on the 
court’s ruling on the shareholders’ likelihood of success, so avoiding the issue 
might also impede settlement; second, it would undermine Delaware’s well-
deserved and highly valued reputation for speed. 
Did Delaware suffer any damage from refusing to decide?  Probably not.  
While it is true that Delaware cannot routinely defer to the courts of sister 
states on cases involving Delaware law without undermining its preeminent 
role as the authoritative interpreter of its own law, a rare exception hardly 
threatens that dominance.  As expected, the New York court upheld the 
transaction: in December 2008, after the merger had closed, it dismissed the 
damages action on summary judgment.226  We do not expect that court’s 
opinion to influence Delaware law. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE FEDERALISM 
The shotgun marriage of Bear Stearns and J.P. Morgan, a match made by 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, presents a real-time case study of 
Delaware’s place in the U.S. corporate lawmaking system.  There are a number 
of lessons that can be drawn from the experience. 
First, Delaware’s treatment of the Bear Stearns litigation emphasizes the 
extent to which Delaware avoids the limelight in cases in which there is a 
danger of strong public criticism, a strategy that we have argued elsewhere 
reduces the risk of a backlash against Delaware’s status as maker of de facto 
national corporate law.227  Just as being out front on the corporate scandals, 
à la Eliot Spitzer, would have been very dangerous for Delaware, so too, taking 
a leading role in the Bear Stearns matter would have been very dangerous, 
especially if something bad had happened. 
Second, the Bear Stearns case posed particular problems for Delaware’s 
determinedly old-fashioned, apolitical style of adjudication.228  Delaware’s 
decisions derive part of their legitimacy from being perceived as technical and 
apolitical.229  In this regard, Bear Stearns was truly a no-win situation: 
enjoining the deal would have landed Delaware in the middle of political 
debate; not enjoining the deal could have been viewed by insiders as a 
 
 226 Id. 
 227 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1617–18. 
 228 Id. at 1611–15. 
 229 Id. 
KAHANROCK GALLEYSFLIPS 3/12/2009  8:01:14 AM 
758 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58 
political, instead of legal, decision—detracting from Delaware’s continued 
legitimacy. 
Third, the federal system, with numerous federal and state actors, permits 
Delaware to duck “hot potato” issues such as this one.  Delaware sometimes 
finds it in its interest to duck such issues.230  But ducking issues carries risks of 
its own: duck too many and you become irrelevant.  Delaware, as this case 
shows, thus finds itself performing a very delicate balancing act: it must 
maintain its centrality in corporate law while avoiding high-profile, politically 
charged, and potentially partisan controversies that could provoke a political 
reaction. 
Finally, this case study highlights Delaware’s complex relationship with 
other states and stands as an exception.  In general, Delaware is respectful to 
other states on matters outside what it views as core issues of Delaware law.231  
But Delaware also expects similar deference from other states with regard to 
matters that fall (in Delaware’s assessment) within its legitimate sphere.  
Delaware has a firm view that matters relating to the “internal affairs” of 
Delaware corporations fall within its sphere and has been quite hostile toward 
California’s or New York’s attempts to encroach.232  Indeed, Delaware has 
argued that the internal affairs doctrine may be constitutionally mandated.233  
Furthermore, as we have argued above, Delaware believes that its expert courts 
should decide “novel and substantial issues of Delaware corporate law.”234 
As both Topps and Bear Stearns indicate, Delaware is on a collision course 
with New York.  That collision will come sooner rather than later if New York 
adheres to Justice Cahn’s position that a New York court may not stay an 
action that was first filed in New York (even by a day), so long as there is a 
factual nexus to New York (and without regard to the state of incorporation).  
We expect that Delaware will largely ignore the refusal of New York to stay a 
first-filed action arising under Delaware law, and will proceed with its own 
process, while defending its ability to adjudicate claims by assuring that the 
Delaware case will be decided first and thus be entitled to receive full faith and 
 
 230 Id. at 1621. 
 231 See id. at 1615. 
 232 See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 958–60 (Del. Ch. 2007); VantagePoint 
Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1115–16 (Del. 2005). 
 233 VantagePoint Venture, 871 A.2d at 1113. 
 234 MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., No. 8126, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 545, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1985). 
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credit in the New York courts.  With the speed and expertise of its Chancery 
Court, Delaware should be able to win any “race to final judgment.” 
But the Bear Stearns case was not the place to fight out that issue.  The 
opportunity to dodge a bullet by letting Justice Cahn handle the case was 
sufficiently valuable for Delaware that it wisely chose to overlook what in 
other contexts would be viewed as overreaching by New York. 
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